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Conscientious objection to military training and service in peacetime and to active participation in combat is not a novel phenomenon
of our times. In this study, Rev. Costanzo reviews the historical and
legal perspective of the problem by projecting it against a summary
review of the history of conscription in Europe and America. By this
process he attempts to ascertain the moral and legal grounds by which
the political community, particularly the United States, grants exemption
from the military requirements of a nation to the protestors.

CONSCRIPTION AND THE
CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS
Joseph F. Costanzo*
CoNscMPTI oN
Western Europe

P

ioR to the French Revolution, the system of universal military training and service was unknown. Liability to military duty by every able-bodied male citizen is as ancient as
the civil society that wills to survive against conquest or defeat
by foreign forces. This call to duty has always rested on the
principle that everyone who chooses to enjoy the benefits of
civil peace, order, and security, is reasonably obligated to come
to the defense of that community. As George Washington
observed:
It may be laid down as a primary position . . . that
every citizen who enjoys the protection of a free government, owes not only a portion of his property, but
even of his personal services to the defense of it.
In the middle of the fifteenth century, Charles VII organized from the mercenaries who had served under him in
the Hundred Years' War, the compagnies d'ordonnance,and
thereby laid the foundation of the national standing army in
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France.1 In Spain, the regular army developed with the Italian wars of the sixteenth century. Atkinson notes: "The oldest regiments of the present Spanish army claiming descent
from the tercios date from 1535." The organization of regular
armies at the disposal of the sovereign, trained in accordance
with professional standards of military experience, and adaptable to needs as defined in a nascent military science occurred
in both France and Spain during the sixteenth century.
The development of standing armies in Europe proceeded
at first differently in the various nation states but each was
quick to learn and imitate from the undoubted military effectiveness of the other countries. Spain maintained a "relatively high" effective peace strength. The only regular troops
in France down to 1660 were comprised of royal guards, some
squadrons of "gendarmerie," and some regiments of infantry
called significantly "les vieux." In most other countries the
only permanent forces kept under arms by their soverigns
included select personal guards, small garrisons, and not infrequently a limited regular army to serve as a nucleus.
If France is to be credited with the rudimentary beginnings of the national standing army, to her must also be attributed important radical innovations in military organization which were undertaken under the direction of the Marquis
de Louvois, the celebrated Minister of War, upon the accession
of Louis XIV to the French throne.
The all-out effort of the French Revolutionaries to guard
their new born Republic against threatened invasion from a
coalition of encircling inimical forces as well as against internal peril brought about a radical innovation in French military history that may be labelled as "the nation in arms."
Subject to the regular army and navy forces poised against
foreign armed might and the troops assigned to internal policing, the First Republic enrolled all citizens and children capable of shouldering arms in the national guard which could be
summoned to supplement the public force. The debates in the
1. ATKINSON, II, ENCYCLOPEDIA BmTTANICA, 592-625 (ed. 11, 1910); D' AUMALB,
Duc, LES INSTITUTIONS MILITAIRES DE LA FRANCE (Paris, 1867).
THE
ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY (1945); ATKINSON, A HISTORY OF
GERMANY (London, 1908) MAUDE, CONSCRIPTION, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITAN-

NICA (11 ed.) PHIFPS, THE ARMIES OF THE FIRST FRENCH REPUBLIC.
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French Assembly especially from 1789 to 1793 reveal the dilemma posed on the one hand by the insistence of the French libertarians such as Mirabeau, the Duc de Liancourt, and others to
recruit a regular army by volunteer enlistment, most of whom
had never had any previous military training and service, and
on the other, the dire necessity of obviating the patent defects
of such a plan by compulsory universal training and servicein a word, by national conscription. By 1793 the libertarian
plan had been tried and found gravely ineffective. On August
23, 1793, the French Convention decreed' what may rightly be
designated as the first formal official plan of compulsory
military training and service. Ironically, national conscription was born of the need to defend the liberty and security
of the French Republic and not from the demands of an all
powerful royal sovereign. There is no doubt but that this
national conscription and mobilization of French manpower
resources must be credited with the survival of the French
Republic and the complete collapse of foreign danger.
With the security of the Republic now beyond doubt its
aggressive capabilities became manifest by Bonaparte's successes of 1796. Certain apparent inequities of recruitment of
the decree of 1793 were corrected by the law of September 5,
1798 in which the term "conscription" was first used to describe compulsory military service.
If France has to this point been responsible for the succession of military organizations that culminated in the system
of conscription, it was left to Prussia to develop and perfect
the system as a permanent peacetime program. After Napoleon crushed the Prussian armies at Jena in 1806, he sought
to make sure that Prussia would not regenerate her former
military strength by limiting her armed forces to a mere 42,000
by the terms of the Treaty of Tilsit of 1807. But these restrictions were ingeniously circumvented by the "Krumper
2.

ANDERSON, CONSTITUTIONS AND OTHER SELECT DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF
THE HISTORY OF FRANCE, 184-185 1789-1907, (Minneapolis, 1908).

1.

"From this moment until that in which the enemy shall have been
driven from the soil of the Republic of France, all Frenchmen are
in permanent requisition for the service of the armies. The young
man shall go into battle; the married men shall forge arms and
transport provisions."

3. "The levy shall be general. The unmarried citizens and widowers
without children from eighteen to twenty-five years, shall march
first."
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system" contrived by General Scharnhorst. The limit of 42,000 set by the Treaty of Tilsit was never exceeded at any one
time but by the device of substituting three to five new recruits
for an equal number withdrawn each month, Prussia had by
1813, a reserve of 270,000 trained soldiers. When the new
Prussian army had attested by its military triumphs to the
effectiveness of the short-term compulsory service and reserves, several important advantages, civilian in character,
were also vindicated. A truly broad national army had been
formed whose patriotism for the Fatherland proved to be
superior in ardor and dedication to that of the traditional
professional lifetime soldier. Further, by its process of gradual turnover, civilian commitments, personal and familial
were not disrupted seriously for any intolerable length of time,
nor were any of the industries and requirements of commerce
and agriculture seriously thrown off balance. What had been
an emergency contrivance of Scharnhorst to circumvent the
restrictions of the Treaty of Tilsit became the first scientific
military law for universal peacetime military service on September 3, 1814.8
If any persuasion was needed to point to the superior
effectiveness of the Scharnhorst-Boyen military system, it was
painfully and most convincingly borne home by the Prussian
victories over Denmark (1864), Austria (1866), Napoleon III
(1870). One after the other European states adopted the program of peacetime conscription so that, with the exception of
England, practically every country drawn into the vortex of
World War I had a sizeable army of citizen soldiers already
trained for combat through peacetime conscription. The
standing reserve of large national forces trained and ready
for combat by peace-time conscription and built up by a short
term turn-over program had served more than one advantage.
On the one hand, it avoided the prohibitive cost of maintaining
large armies of long-term professional volunteers; and, on the
other, it was a silent show of strength in the diplomatic power
plays. But like a two-edged sword, these advantages gave way
to armageddon when ready trained forces were mobilized by
rival nations crowding each other geographically.
3. Ford, Boyen's Military Law, AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEw, April, 1915.
The law is usually referred to as "Boyen's Law".
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England
Great Britain alone of all the Great Powers of Europe
has, partly owing to reliance on its maritime ascendency and
to its separation from contiguous foreign borders, and partly
4
from a supposed aversion to conscripted standing armies
relied almost entirely upon volunteer enlistment for her needs
of land warfare and upon impressment in the navy for her
requirements of her farflung empire. The two conscription
bills of 1704 and 1707 were rejected by Parliament as unconstitutional. But in the 1750's, Parliament adopted two acts
for the forcible induction of vagrants, "the idle poor and
disorderly, without means of support." Whether the exemption of the nobility and the gentry, and of the middle class
who had a vote in the election of members of Parliament
should suggest that conscription was unbecoming for such as
these, free and economically independent men, and, on the
other hand, becoming and beneficent for free but burdensome
Englishmen, is a matter of conjecture. In 1914 volunteer recruitment failed to fulfill the higher quotas necessary for continental warfare and England stumbled to compulsory military training and service through a succession of poorly conceived and administered experiments at raising troops by the
draft system. With the conclusion of the war, England reverted to the volunteer system until April 27, 1923, when England again had recourse to compulsory training and service
after the signing of the Munich Pact.
United States
The history of military service in the United States has
steadily veered from the earlier prevailing tradition of volunteer recruitment to the draft in time of war until it has become
today generally an unquestioned policy of national defense.
The sore point of contemporary controversy is compulsory
training and service in peacetime in an undeclared war. The
American colonials, heirs of the traditional English loose system, were for the most part satisfied with the ability of colonial militia to cope with enemy assaults upon closely-grouped
4.

ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY, 747-756 Houghton
Mifflin, (1946) May, Thomas, E. Constitutional History of England (cf.
p. 219).
TASWELL-LANGMEAD,
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settlements. That volunteer military service even in time of
war was the prevailing mind is attested to in several ways by
the set of grievances in the Declaration of Independence protesting not only the presen e of standing armies in times of
peace without the consent of colonial legislatures, the independence and superior status of the military over the civil, and
the quartering of armed troops among the colonials, but alsomore to the point- 'He has constrained our fellow-citizens,
taken captive on the high seas, to bear arms against their
country.. .. " But the experience of the American Revolution

made only too patent the weakness of the militia system for
united defense. At least nine of the States adopted constitutions during the Revolutionary War which sanctioned compulsory military service.' But with the exception of Massachusetts and Virginia, which resorted to conscription, the
American Revolutionary War was fought and won by volunteer recruits. However, the weaknesses of the militia system
for united defense, for the more complex organizational requirements of maneuvering against an enemy marshalled in
large numbers and proceeding according to planned military
strategies, were almost tragically revealed during the American Revolution.
The Continental Congress authorized a regular force, but
(could not) compel recruitment. At best, their authorinot
did
zations carried no more weight than urgent recommendations
to the colonies that they provide for the common cause. Undoubtedly, the Revolutionary War would have been concluded
in less time and with less casualties, had Washington's protest
against the militia system been heeded. Surely, a permanent
armed force with substantially the same men trained and
disciplined for combat and committed for the war's duration
was to be preferred to the annual shift of fresh recruits, untrained and inexperienced in the contemporary military engagements. The Articles of Confederation spoke of the necessity of a minimal "body of forces" for the defense of each
state in time of peace (Article VI) and of land forces "raised
by any state for the common defense" (Article VII) without
specifying how each state should recruit and without confer5. Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366, 380
(1918); Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S. 3 (1918).
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ring upon the Confederacy any power of recruitment. The
Constitution of 1789 set down that the Congress shall have
power to declare war, raise and support armies, provide and
maintain a navy, call forth the militia and provide for their
organization and arming (Article I, Sec. 8) without explicitly
saying whether that meant a national recruitment, voluntary
or compulsory, separate from and in addition to the "calling
forth of the state militia." This inattention may be due, as
Story explained (Commentaries, No. 1187), to the mind at the
Federal Convention that the legislative branch of government
be designated as the sole power to raise armies' in time of
peace as well as during a period of armed conflict. Even so,
a sort of check was placed upon the Congress by the constitutional provision that "no appropriation of money to that use
shall be for a longer term than two years." (Article I, see. 8,
cl. 12). We may note here that Rhode Island, which was the
last of the thirteen original states to ratify the Constitution,
made earnest effort to get an amendment that would bar conscription.
Scarcely a year after his inauguration, President Washington, who had known the dangerous uncertainties of an impermanent and inexperienced army during the War of Independence, proposed to the Congress on January 21, 1790, the
cultivation of a well-regulated militia through universal training for young men between eighteen and twenty. The trainees
were to spend approximately a month in camp for the first
two years and only ten days, the third year. Congress was not
amenable to the presidential recommendation.' The War of
1812 disclosed only too patently the tragic shortcomings of the
untrained volunteers of the militia. But the proposal in 1814
for the conscription of men for the Army by James Monroe,
then Secretary of War, was strongly attacked by Daniel Webster in the Senate and widely unpopular with the people.
The war ended with the Treaty of Ghent (Christmas Eve,
6. Undoubtedly English history motivated the delegates at the Federal Convention to our constitutional formula. In England, prior to the Revolution
of 1688, the King's prerogative power to raise armies in times of peace
posed real threats to the exercise of liberties. The Bill of Rights of 1688,
resolved the problem not by prohibiting standing armies altogether in times
of peace but by making their existence and maintenance contingent upon
Parliamentary consent.
7.

PALMER, WASHINGTON, LINCOLN, WILSON: THREE WAR STATESMEN

(Double-

day, Doran, 1930).
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1814) before the bill could be enacted.' A summary presentation of the challenge to the constitutionality of conscription
can be found in the Report and Resolutions of the Hartford
Covention of January 4, 1815.
The war with Mexico in 1847 proved again the inefficacy
of short-term volunteers. While General Scott was halfway
to Mexico City approximately 40 per cent of his men returned
home because their enlistments had expired. While he waited
for replacements, Santa Anna was able to recoup his badly
beaten army and again a war had been needlessly prolonged
for want of a trained army.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, the States had their
militia and the Federal Government a standing army of 16,000
troops, which were stationed mostly on the frontier. Congress
was not in session and would not convene for three months.
President Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for three
months service, scarcely adequate time to train men for actual
combat. By April, 1862 the Southern Confederacy acknowledged it had failed to realize its military requirements by
volunteer enlistments for a full year's service and adopted
universal conscription. The failure of the Union states to
provide the necessary militia forced the Congress a year later
to pass the Enrollment Bill on March 3, 1863, the "Draft Act"
as it was called."° Riots broke out in New York City and elsewhere. Ninety-eight Federal registrants were killed or
wounded in the first four months as they attempted to enforce
the registration and enrollment. Although by the conclusion
of the war, 1,120,000 were drafted by the Federal government,
8.
9.

Selective Draft Law Cases (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. at 385.
DWIGHT, HISTORY OF THE HARTFORD CONVENTION, p. 368 ff
The effort to deduce this power from the right of raising armies is a
flagrant attempt to pervert the . . . Constitution. The armies of the
United States have always been raised by contract, never by conscription, and nothing can be wanting in a government possessing the power
thus claimed to usurp the entire control of the militia in derogation of
the authority of the states, and to convert it by impressment into a

10.

While the conscription system both for the North and South made available

standing army.
larger resources of manpower and offered obviously better opportunities
for discipline and training, it was marred by serious defect-substitutions
for service, monetary commutation in lieu thereof, exemptions for religious
conscientious objectors. In the North, the oppressive nature of the draft
was unfortunately underscored by assigning its operation to the military.
Modern draft systems have completely eliminated the military from local

administration of the draft and assigned to local civilian boards the task
of determining the order of service and the application of exemptions.
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only 42,347 were actually inducted into service. The preponderance of the Union forces were volunteers who had joined
either in anticipation of the draft or in expectation of generous
bounties.
Prior to America's participation in the first World War,
efforts were made to provide some stabilized resource of volunteer military service, notably by the Act of 1903" and the
National Defense Act of 1916.12 The first war-time conscription in American history was established by the Selective
Service Act of May 18, 1917. In addition to the nearly three
million who were inducted through the Selective Service Act,
approximately one million enlisted voluntarily in the Army,
while almost the entire Navy and Marine Corps as well were
made up of volunteers. Volunteer recruiting has always been
and still remains the primary source and the core of American
military manpower as a matter of traditional and cherished
principle; conscription is designed to supplement it and is by
now a fixed policy of national defense in time of war, questioned only by those who would restrict such a policy to the
status of a declared war but not agree to it for an undeclared
war. The Act of 1940 was the first peacetime selective service
law enacted in the shadow of war. Apart from the second
World War, American combat participation in Korea and
Vietnam has taken place under the status of undeclared wars.
Active military combat by United States armed forces in undeclared wars are not a rarity in American history. But the
military requirements of manpower were always sufficiently
provided for without any recourse to compulsory service.
What distinguishes our contemporay combat service is that it
takes place in that gray area of "peacetime" and undeclared
11. The Act of 1903, defined the militia as inclusive of all able-bodied male
citizens, from the age of 18 to 45, and every able-bodied male alien within
the same age range, who had declared his intention to become a citizen. The
militia was distinguished into two categories, the Organized Militia and
the Reserve Militia. The former comprised the National Guard of the
States whose components were to be trained in encampments and drills. Military schools for the training of officers were to be established. The
Organized Militia was the first actual similitude to George Washington's
plan of January 21, 1790, for a "trained militia". The Reserve Militia
comprised all male citizens from 18 to 45 years and in its comprehensiveness
it is suggestive of a selective service system. The President of the United
States was empowered to call any part of the militia for active service up
to nine months for the purposes of executing Federal law, repel invasion
or suppress rebellion.
12. Though this Act was passed scarcely a year before America's entry into the
war, it still did not provide for national mobilization,
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war status by the requirements of a compulsory military
training and service law. This has contributed to doubly
compound the problematics of the conscientious objector, as
we shall observe later on. Be that as it may, consideration of
peacetime conscription has been cast within a modern context
of the multiple mutual defense treaties, numbering almost fifty, by which our nation through its Presidents and the Senate
has committed itself to go to the military defense of its signatory allies in the interest of national security. The precarious
peace that may be and has been instantly shattered at different
places without any formal declarations of war and at times
even against reasonable expectation has made even more urgent the need for preparedness for such eventualities. While
our draft policy has emerged almost exclusively from actual
wars, today it is related to the immediate prospects of undeclared wars. Whatever tentative conclusions one may come to
as to the compatibility of compulsory military training and
service laws in peacetime for a democratic society, it would be
a serious and misleading misconstruction of the question to
relate these laws to a chauvinist militarism or militant nationalism or the arrogance of power of nineteenth century Europe
and of ancient Empires.
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CONSCRIPTION

The discussion about the constitutionality of conscription
is directed to two distinct problems. The first raises the question whether Congress has the constitutional power to enact
such laws. The second, while conceding that Congress is empowered by the Constitution to enact compulsory military
training and service laws, insists that the exercise of such a
power must not violate personal rights guaranteed to the individual by the same Constitution.
Kneedler v. Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238 (1863)3
First, the question whether Congress is invested by the
Constitution with the legal power to conscript men into military service.
13. Cf. BERNSTEIN, Conscription and the Constitution: The Amazing Case of
Kneedler v. Lane, 53 A.B.J. 708-712, August, 1967. I have relied on this
article for the excerpts from the Kneedler case.
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The Civil War draft law of 1863 was put into operation
without any challenge in the federal courts, but it was brought
before the bar of the Pennsylvania State Supreme Court in
a proceeding that may be unmatched for its bizzare turn of
circumstances. Henry S. Kneedler, Francis B. Smith and William Francis Nickels sought injunctions to restrain the Enrolling Board of the Fourth Congressional District of Pennsylvania from inducting them into the Union army. They
contended that the conscription act of 1863 was unconstitutional because the Federal Government was without power to
compel military service by direct action upon a citizen, an
action which only the states could lawfully take in recruiting
state militias. The constitutional empowerment of Congress
to raise armies, they maintained, operates upon the citizen
only by volunteer enlistment.
On November 9, 1863, all five members of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court wrote separate and lengthy opinions
and split three to two against the constitutionality of the
draft act. Chief Justice Lowrie, in the opinion of the court,
maintained that the congressional power to raise armies (Art.
I, Sec. 8, cl. 12) and the "ancillary power to pass 'all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for that purpose' " (cl.
18) were the directly relevant premises controlling the constitutional issue. He found that not even the necessity to suppress insurrection and to repel invasions constitutionally
warranted the federal government to conscript armed forces
since even these emergencies were explicitly and specifically
provided for by "calling forth the militia." (cl. 15) The
Tenth Amendment sets down that "powers not delegated to
the United States . . . are reserved to the States respectively. .. ." Arguing on a narrow construction of the Con-

stitution, he concluded that powers not granted are reserved
and none should be implied. In a word, any forced levy of the
military by the Congress must be through the States from the
state militias under their own state officers and not by any
direct action upon the citizens. He also considered the issue
independently of the emergency situations of rebellion and
invasions (for which cl. 15 specifies the definite mode of fed-

eral suppression). Forced levies, he wrote, in order to recruit
the regular army, is still not warranted by any constitutional
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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grant of power. Exploring the question further, he would not
allow that the mode of coercion of the draft law of 1863 to be
constitutional even if arguendo it be assumed that the regular
army may be recruited from forced levies. The ultimate
catalyst is really the lurking argument of implied powers
which the court's opinion rejects in its narrow construction
in accordance with the rule the of the common law. One would
have supposed that by 1963 the Ilamiltonian-Marshall doctrine of implied powers had surely by then become unquestioned. Perhaps in an effort to ward off this supposition, he
held that the explicit provisions of the Constitution were such
on this matter that an implied power interpretation was
foreclosed. Chief Jusice Lowrie resorted to history. The militia was a state institution and it was called "the militia of the
several states." (Article II, section 2, ci. 1) The right of the
states to its own militia was unaffected by the constitutional
grant of powers to the federal government. On the contrary,
the Constitution specifically defines the manner of suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions by "calling forth
the militia." Chief Justice Lowrie objected that the draft law
was "an unauthorized substitute for the militia of the states."
Its provision, whereby all able-bodied men within certain
age groups "are 'declared to constitute the national forces'
.., covers the whole ground of the militia, and exhausts it
entirely." On the telling question of the jurisdiction of the
state supreme court to adjudicate the litigation, he maintained
that a federal officer no less than a state officer could be sued
in the state courts. Besides, President Lincoln's suspension
of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus removed the
federal avenue to the United States Supreme Court and only
the state courts were available to afford relief.
Both of the concurring opinions of Justices Woodward
and Thompson stressed the undoubted influence of the English
tradition upon the thinking of the framers of our constitution. "Assuredly!" wrote Justice Woodward, "the framers
of our constitution did not intend to subject the people of the
states to a system of conscription which was applied in the
mother country only to paupers and vagabonds. On the contrary, I infer that the power conferred on Congress was the
power to raise armies by the ordinary English mode of volhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/10
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untary enlistments." Besides, he emphasized, the true test of
constitutional government is to preserve its provisions in the
very time of crisis.
Times of rebellion, above all others, are the times
when we should stick to our fundamental law, lest we
drift into anarchy on one hand, or into despotism on
the other. The great sin of the (present) rebellion
consists in violating the constitution, whereby every
man's civil rights are exposed to sacrifice.14
Justice Thompson repeated much the same argument, the
continuity with the English tradition, and wrote with expression of deeply felt emotion how on his recent visit to the
slopes of Runnymede, the memory of the English past "sent
a thrill to my heart in admiration of those old barons who
stood up there and demanded from a tyrannical sovereign that
the lines between power and right should be then and there
distinctly marked...

Our forefathers marked those lines in

the federal constitution. I must adhere to them.""
Both of the separate dissenting opinions of Justices
Strong and Reed argued, on the contrary, to the constitutionality of the draft with reliance upon the doctrine of implied powers. They would not allow that the federal government could have a lesser power to draft men than the states
had. They noted that while there are limitations upon the
means which may be used for the support of the army the
government, for example, could not arbitrarily seize private
property for the maintenance of the army nor could an appropriation be longer than the explicitly prescribed two year span
there were no restrictions set upon the means of raising an
army.
The Kneedler case is a bizarre curiousity in the history of
constitutional law. The restraining injunctions set by the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court majority upon the federal offices on November 9, 1863 were vacated on January 16, 1864
by the conversion of the former minority into a new majority
when Justice Agnew succeeded to the bench upon the retirement of Chief Justice Lowrie. To the despair of the hapless
14. Excerpts are taken from the lengthier quotations in Mr. Bernstein's article.
15. Id.
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new minority, the court now held by benefit of the newly
formed majority that the state did not have the legal power
to interfere by injunction, even if the draft law were deemed
beyond the constitutional delegation of power to the Congress.
As to the propriety of vacating a court decree by a numerical
shift of concurrence after the decree has been put into final
form and without benefit of new facts to warrant reconsideration, we leave that to the academic disquisitions of scholars of
American law. The Kneedler case was the only court test of
the legality of the first wartime military draft and the action
of the federal government prevailed simply by a routine exchange of personnel on the bench. Despite the fact that the
Kneedler case covers approximately one hundred pages in
the Pennsylvania reports, it received no more than a short
allusion to it from Chief Justice White in his opinion in the
Selective Draft Law Cases in 1918 and without any notice at
all of the bizarre reversal of the first decision by the second.
Selective Draft Law Cases-World War I
It was not until 1918 that the constitutional power of the
federal government to conscript able-bodied men into the
armed forces was upheld by the United States Supreme Court
ruling in the Selective Draft Law Cases.1" Conscription was
attacked on several grounds: it operated to preempting the
states of their right to "a well-regulated militia," that the
power which the constitituon confers upon the Congress to
require compulsory service is that of "calling forth the
militia" which is immediately related to three specifically
designated objectives-"to execute the laws of the union,
supress insurrections and repel invasions" (Article I, section
8, cl. 15) without any mention of military combat service
abroad, and thirdly, that conscription imposes involuntary
servitude in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. In addition, it was contended that the Draft Act was in contravention of the religious clauses of the First Amendment, since
the Act provided exemption to religious conscientious objectors and to ministers of religion and theological students.
16. Cf. Arver v. United States, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918); Cox v. Wood 247
U.S. 3 (1918).
17. It is interesting to note that the objections raised by the defendants are
strikingly similar tQ the ones raised in the Kneedler case of 1863.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/10

14

Costanzo: Conscription and the Conscientious Objectors

1971

CONSCIUPTION AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

601

(This later charge was summarily rejected out of hand by the
Court without any direct confrontation with and consideration
of the issue raised. 8 ) The Supreme Court responded that the
powers of the states to raise militia must be viewed subject
to the superior power of the federal government to raise and
support armies; that the congressional power to raise an army
is a separate empowerment from the constitutional authorization for "calling forth the militia" and being independent of
it, is in no way limited by it. (The a minus a maius argument
of Kneedler appears here reversed for a more effective defense
of national power.)
The constitutionality of conscription is based then squarely upon the power of the Congress "to raise and support
armies," an empowerment that the Supreme Court declares
to be separate and independent of the constitutional delegation of power to the Congress "to provide for calling forth
the militia to execute the laws of the union, suppress insurrections and repell [sic] invasions." A great number of litigations while conceding the validity of compulsory service have
challenged the legality of a specific law because it was alleged
it violated certain constitutional rights. In every instance
lower federal courts have upheld the constitutionality of the
law and its application."
18. The Court evidently felt satisfied that it had already disposed of this sort
of argument completely to its own satisfaction by anticipating it in an
earlier ruling prior to the American entry to the First World War. Butler
v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916). On the intent of the Thirteenth Amendment to it had said:
It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated
as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement
of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services in
the army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was
liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction
of the latter by depriving it of essential powers.
19. See LEGAL ASPECTS OF SELECTIVE SERVICE, Revised January 1, 1963, Selective
Service System, Washington, D.C., pp. 3-5.
"Unquestionably the Congress has the power to enlist the manpower of
the nation by conscription both for the prosecution of the war and for
a peace-time army, and it may subject to military jurisdiction those
who are unwilling as well as those who are eager to come to the defense
of their nation. It is within the power of Congress to call everyone to
the colors, and no one under the jurisdiction of the Sovereign nation,
whatever his status, is exempt from military service except by the
grace of the Government. Aliens may properly be required to forfeit
any future opportunity to become citizens of the United States, in order
to secure exemption.
Furthermore, the Congress has power to seek information through
registr. tion or otherwise in peacetime, to prepare for an intelligent
exercise of the power to raise armies by conscription; and in the present
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CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS UNDER AMERICAN LAW

A Historical-Legal Conspectus
In discoursing on conscientious objectors, we are focusing
primarily on the moral claim they make upon legal protection
for the immunity and inviolability of their claim of conscience,
which, practically, means not to be coerced to combat duty.
There are of course other related questions, whether they ought
also to be excused from noncombat participation in military
operations, or even against assignment to civilian services
outside the military. There is too the very troublesome question of selective conscientious objection to a particular war.
Cognate to the discussion but not agnate to it is the question
of the preferential status that follows upon ministerial exemption. This too poses a vexing constitutional problem. If on the
one hand, religion is defined in the traditional sense of ontological and moral relations of man to God, a transcendental
Being, the Creative Author of all reality, who is to be worshipped, loved, and obeyed, then a minister or divinity student
of such a creed who is exempted from military service is surely
being preferred over leaders of or official representatives of
non-religious congregations, v.g. such as the Secular Humanist. If on the other hand, religion be widely understood as ultimate belief without any requirement that the ultimate be related to an Absolute Being distinct from and superior to the
human conscience, as was first proposed directly in Torcaso
v. Watkins, 0 and earlier and less directly in the dictum in
phase of history, marked by wars undeclared, failure to register the
manpower of the country would be a failure to provide for the common
defense.
The power to wage war successfully is not limited to combat action,
but extends to every matter and every activity related to war which
affects its conduct and progress, and the Congress is the judge as to
whether a clear and present danger exists requiring the enactment of
a selective service law.
The selective service law does not violate the constitutional principle
that equality of duties is based on equality of rights, nor does it violate
the constitutional provision against involuntary servitude. It does not
provide for an invalid delegation of powers, either with respect to
conscientious objectors or otherwise, and it does not deny freedom of
religion, freedom of speech, or due process of law. Neither is it objectionable as class legislation. An assignment to civilian work is not in
violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Cf. footnote references to
specific court decisions, numbers 32 to 49".
20. Cf. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, (1961).
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Everson v. Board of Education,2 then a different complexus
of problems arise. 2
Prior to the formation of the National Government, sensitive concern for the inviolability of the religious conscientious objector to the bearing of arms reaches back to the earliest collective resistance on the part of the colonies. Scarcely
two weeks after the First Continental Congress had issued its
Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms
(July 8) for the protection of their rights, the Congress on
July 18, 1775 passed a resolution advising-(it could do no
more)-the colonists to respect the rights of conscience of
those who were opposed to the bearing of arms because of their
religious beliefs. Since it would yet be another year before
the Colonists would break definitely with England this respectful counsel to exemption takes on added significance when
projected against the need of an effective resort to armed resistence to secure their rights. But this should not be too
surprising. The Continental Congress was acting within a
traditional frame of mind on the matter which was already
widely expressed during the earlier revolutionary period by
constitutional provisions or by statutes."
The proffered
exemption-in some instances restricted to christians and in
others extended to non-christians-was accompanied by the
requirement that the beneficiary of this exemption engage
in some charitable or purely civil service as the circumstances
warranted. Strikingly anticipatory of the first federal draft
act of 1863, the exempted conscientious objector was generally
required to obtain a substitute or provide funds in order to
pay for a substitute.2 4
21. Cf. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
"The establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up
a church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religion, or prefer one religion over another."
Cf. CopwIN, "THE SUPREME COURT As NATIONAL SCHOOL BOARD", 14 Law
and Contemporary Problems, 3, 10 (1949) for a critical appraisal of these
statements.
22. Among which, must be included, by an ironic twist of logical precession, the
question, what happens to the wall of separation of the absolute separationists? Separation supposes some significant distinction which the undifferentiated monism of the novel meaning of religion now excludes as a
preferential status for the purposes of law.
23. Cf. Macintosh v. United States, 42 F. 2d 845, 847-848, rev'd, 283 U.S. 605
(1931), wherein the circuit court refers to numerous colonial statutes and
constitutional provisions.
24. Cf. KURLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, University of North
Carolina Press, 1955. p. 15, conscription for military service outside the
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The Annals of the First Congress, which undertook, at
Madison's insistence, to fulfill the pledge given on a Bill of
Rights, disclose nothing more than tentative considerations
on incorporating a provision for religious conscientious objectors each of which was cancelled by critical objections that
prevailed over the proffered suggestions. 5 Whether or not
the final rendering of the religious clauses of the first amendment embodied any congressional intent for the protection
of those conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms is a
question that receives some light but no definite settlement
from the amendment which the House tagged on to the Senate
Federal Draft Bill of 1814 which James Monroe as Secretary
of War had proposed to the Congress for the more effective
colony was barred by the Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), p. 47.
Conscientious dissenters were exempted from military service upon payment
of a fee by the Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights (1776) Article VIII.
p. 62, New York Constitution (1777) excused Quakers from militia duty,
as non-believers in armed resistence, upon the payment of an exemption fee.
Cf. SouRcEs OF OuR LIBERTIES. Edited by Richard L. Perry. American Bar
Foundation, 1952, p. 329. A Declaration of the Rights of the Inhabitants
of the Commonwealth, or State of Pennsylvania. Article VIII. "Nor can
any man who is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay such equivalent . . ." As early as 1673 those
who had conscientious scruples were exempted from military service in
Rhode Island very likely because it had come largely under the control of
Quakers. Cf. THOMAS and RICHARD, HISTORY OF THE SOCIETY OF FRIENDS IN
AMERICA, (American Church History Series, Vol. XII), p. 211.
25. Cf. KURLAND, THE BIRTH OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS, on Madison's championship of a Bill of Rights against the sluggish reaction of his fellow congressmen in the House of Representatives.
Madison initiated the discussions on the amendments on Monday, June 8,
1789, Cf. 1 Gales Annals of Congres- 424 ff.
"The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed;
well armed and well regulated militia being the best security of a free
country: but no person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms shall be
compelled to render service in person." The wording of Madison's
proposal "in person" would on its face allow substitution or fiscal
commutation to pay for service by another.
On Monday, August 17, 1789, the House resolved itself into a committee
with Mr. Boudinot presiding. The whole discussion on religious dissenters to the bearing of arms is dispensed with in approximately two
columns. Cf. Gales, ibid, 749-751. Mr. Gerry proposed to confine the
exemption "to persons belonging to a religious sect scrupulous of
bearing arms." Mr. Jackson, while he did not expect everyone to "turn
Quakers or Moravians", some would be defenders of the others. So he
recommended that the exemption be conditioned "upon paying an
equivalent to be established by law". Mr. Smith thought that the
religious objectors "were to be excused provided they found a substitute". Mr. Sherman countered that the religious objection of the dissenters "are equally scrupulous of getting substitutes or paying an
equivalent. Besides, he noted that exemption on credal sectarian grounds
would not be fair to Quakers who would chose to fight for their
country. Mr. Benson brought the whole summary exchange to a close
by moving that the whole clause be omitted. He would rather that the
matter of religious scrupules to the bearing of arms be left "to the
benevolence of the Legislature". The whole clause was voted out, 24
to 22. So much for the debates on conscientious objectors at the time
of the Bill of Rights were being formulated in the first Congress.
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prosecution of the War of 1812. The House amendment stipulated exemption from military conscription for the religious
conscientious objectors because of their membership in a "religious sect or denomination of Christians." ' 26 Though the

proposed Draft Act did not pass both houses of Congress, .the
overwhelming vote of the House of Representatives to the
amended Senate version would suggest that the near contemporaries of the founders of the Republic had not inherited a
conclusive mind on the specific coverage of the conscientious
objectors by the first amendment.
At the outbreak of the Civil War, both the Union and the
Confederacy gathered the manpower for its armed forces indirectly by stipulating the quotas that each state must provide
from its militia. Consequently the conditions for exemption
from military service were regulated by the state constitutions
or statutory laws. As we have already noted, the ineffectiveness of this circuitous system of fulfilling the requirements
of military manpower was first acknowledged by the Southern
Confederacy when it resorted to universal conscription in
April, 1862, and a year later by the Union, when it passed the
Enrollment Bill on March 3, 1863. In the debates on the first
federal draft act of 1863, broadly three approaches were discussed on how to cope with the problem of the conscientious
objector. Should the federal government be regulated by the
already existent state proviso on the matter; should the federal government have its own law providing exemption for those
whose consciences on military participation was regulated by
the creed of a religious sect; the third approach, more involved
than the first two, required that the conscientious objector
should first petition a federal court and seek relief upon proof
of sincerity.27 None of these approaches to the problem survived the critical objections levelled against each and consequently the Act of March 3, 1863 became law without any
exemption for the conscientious objector save that of substitution or commutation upon payment of $300.00. In response
to wide public protect against the monetary commutation
26. 28 Annals of Congress 774-775 (1815) (1789-1824).
27. Cf. CONG. GLOBE, 37th Congress, 3d Session 994, 1389-90 (1863)
27a. Cf. WRIGHT, CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS IN THE CIVIL WAR, Philadelphia, (1931), p. 301, notes that figures are not available to show the
total number of conscientious objectors in the different denominations.
Mennonites seem to predominant, with the Friends, second.
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clause, the Act was amended the following year, February 24,
1864, to provide for noncombatant service to the conscientious
objector who has given sufficient proof of his religious motivation. 7
Less than a year before the United States entry into
World War I, the Congress enacted the National Defense Act
of June 3, 1916, which, in view of the gathering probability of
American involvement in the European theatre, surprisingly
did not establish the machinery or the organization for an
overall national mobilization. The Act authorized exemption
from military service for religious ministers and conferred
upon the President the power to regulate the exemption for
objectors who are motivated by religious beliefs and whose
claim could be reasonably ascertained to be conscientiously
authentic. Such a one was nonetheless required to fulfill certain designated noncombatant services.
The Draft Act of May 18, 1917 was the first wartime
national conscription in American history as compared with
the sectional conscription of the Southern Confederacy and of
the North during the Civil War. It committed the nation to
a full mobilization of manpower and resources. Its broad basis
was the "liability to military service of all male citizens" and
its plan was a "selecture draft" of citizens between 21 and
31 years of age for military service for the duration of the
emergency. It authoritatively disowned once and for all the
earlier practices of bounties, substitutions and fiscal commutation for the payment of a substitute. There were several
categories of the exempted: ministers, students of divinity,
some higher public officials, men engaged in essential occupations as the President might in his discretion regulate, and
serious obligations of dependency. As to the conscientious
objector in the bearing of arms, the Draft Act of 1917 restricted their exemption to those religious scruples which were
related to membership in a recognized pacifist sect.2" The Act
authorized the President to designate noncombatant services
28. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, #4, 40 Stat. 78. That the exemption was available only to those whose objecting conscience was religiously ground can be
reasonable inferred with certainty from the fact that a proposed amendment which founded exemption upon a broader basis other than the specifically defined as membership in "any well-recognized sect or organization . . . whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form. .. ." ibid.
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which the exempted could be required to fulfill. The obviously
narrow restriction of the exempted to affiliation with an
historic pacifist church was considerably widened by presidential regulation which defined the noncombatant military
services to which the exempted could be assigned and which
was expressed in such a way as to include religious conscientious objectors without the concomitant requirement of membership in a historic pacifist sect.29
On August 3, 1919 almost a year after the signing of the
Armistice (on November 11, 1918), Newton Baker, then Secretary of War, recommended to the Congress a bill which proposed three months of compulsory military training for those
between the ages of 18 and 19. Representative Julius Kahn
and Senator Chamberlain at first urged that all young men
undergo six months training and to be subject to additional
training for five more years. Later, as a part of the Army Reorganization Act, which they too sponsored, the requirements
were reduced to four months military training for 19 year
olds and enrollment in the organized reserves for five years
with subsequent refresher courses for two summers, but they
were not liable to any military service. These provisions were
defeated along party lines."0 In what eventually became the
National Defense Act of 1920, the compulsory provisions were
replaced by voluntary enlistments.
The Act of 1940 was the first peacetime selective service
law. It differed from the 1917 Draft Act in several aspects.
It lacked the urgency of the World War I Act which was
passed after the declaration of war. Consequently, it was a
training and service act with emphasis on training. But what
is more to our study, the word "deferment" in the Act of 1940,
with its implication of an abiding duty to serve, replaces the
employment of the word "exemption" which had appeared in
earlier draft law of 1917. Since the two Supreme Court de29. Exec. Order No. 2823, March 20, 1918. Undoubtedly the terms of the Draft
Act in specifically restricting exemption to adherence to a sect conferred
a preferential legal benefit to religious objectors who were members of a
pacifist church as against religious objectors who were not. That however
was not the intent of the Congress. The intent of the Congress was to
provide some objective norm of sincerity and presumptively membership in
such a sect seemed to provide some such evidence.
30. Cf. DICKINSON, THE BUILDING OF AN ARMY, (1922) Ch. XI, "The Army Act
of 1920". Also, PALMER, AMERICA IN ARMS (1921).

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

21

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 10
LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

cisions that are related indirectly or directly to the conscientious objector are the 1917 and the 1948 draft acts and several
lower court rulings are interpretive of the 1940 draft law, it
suffices to note now that since 1917 there have been the 1940,
1948, and recently, the Military Selective Service Act of 1967,
which took cognizance of the Supreme Court's constructive
interpretation of religious scruples in the Seeger case of 1964.
Congressional legislative provisions on conscientious objectors
will be examined in the light of judicial review.
The Conscientious Objector and the Decisional Law
The constitutionality of the 1917 Draft Act was challenged in the Selective Draft Law Cases. In declaring that
act constitutional, the United States Supreme Court summarily dismissed the argument that the exemption clause
was violative of the first amendment's establishment and free
exercise clauses.
We pass without anything but statement the proposition that an establishment of a religion or an interference with the free exercise thereof repugnant to
the First Amendment resulted from the exemption
clause of the act... because we think its unsoundness
is too apparent to require us to do more. 1
Since in fact the 1917 Act provided for religious objectors
affiliated with a historic peace church, and a claim under that
statutory definition would be upheld, it is interesting to conjecture what regard the Court would have for the inviolability
of the religious objector to war whose religious denomination
or church did not forbid participation in war in any form. Or,
further, whether the legislative phrase of a member "of any
well-recognized sect or organization" (whose "existing creed
or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any
form") was not a precarious contingency on the significance
of a believer's sect to others not of his sect. Or, again, what
of the churches whose creed did not forbid arms bearing but
who adopted vigorous statements in support of the right of
31. Selective Draft Law Cases is the title given by the official reporter to
five consolidated appeals (Arver v. United States), 245 U.S. 366, 389-390,
(1918).
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individual Church members to be conscientious objectors."2
Since none of these issues were directly placed before the
Court for review, the summary disposition of the conscientious objector in the complex problematics that could be raised
under the religious clauses of the First Amendment is tolerably acceptable since it was technically correct. That partieular issue was not directly before the Court. To the charge that
conscription was violative of the Thirteenth Amendment proscription of involuntary servitude the Court, as if to express
its opinion of how seriously it thought it should regard this
constitutional challenge, disposed of this issue in the concluding part of its opinion.
Finally, we are unable to conceive upon what theory
the exaction by government from the citizen of the
performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the defense of the rights and honor of the
nation, as a result of a war declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said to be the
imposition of involuntary servitude in violation of
the prohibitions of the Thirteenth Amendment, we
are constrained to the conclusion that the contention
to that effect is refuted by its mere statement.
To begin with, the response obviously skirts around the question of the conscientious objector, which technically is not
before the Court. The reference to duty to defend a nation in
a declared war, while prima facie may raise a distinction between the sense of duty for a declared war and an undeclared
war, would by today be an academic question. True, in the
past, voluntary enlistments were able to cope with any number
of undeclared wars. Today, that would be seriously questionable. Further, whether a declared war has greater demands
than an undeclared war, might be hedged today with a number
of collateral considerations. The immediacy with which the
Commander-in-Chief may have to respond to an obligation
32. This did constitute an actual concrete problem from 1930 to 1940. Cf. III
STOKES, CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES, 294. Among such
churches who defend the right of individual Church members to be conscientious objectors in public statements whose official creed did not forbid
participation in war were: The American Unitarian Association, 1933, 1940;
the Northern Baptist Convention, 1934; the Presbyterian Church of the
United States of America, 1934, the Protestant Episcopal Church, 1934, the
Congregational Christian Churches, 1939; the International Convention of
the Disciples of Christ, 1939; the Methodist Church, 1939, 1940; the Reformed Church in America, 1939; and the United Lutheran Church in
America, 1940.
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incurred under a mutual defense treaty, and the subsequent
congressional enactment of draft laws and monetary appropriations directly related to the bellicose engagement, may
have reduced the solemnity and technicality of a formal declaration of war to less than an invalidating norm." Chief
Justice White did allude to the Civil War Kneedler case and
found therein an identity of ruling with the instant one. He
did not aver, as we have already noted earlier, to the bizarre
way in which the first ruling in Kneedler was reversed by a
sudden shift of court personnel. Though he did not mention
that Kneedler preceded the Thirteenth Amendment, a fact
that would not have any significant bearing on the question
of conscription, the referral of the 1863 decision to a formal
declaration of war as compared with present day conscription
for un undeclared war would not, again it seems to us, hold
any telling significance upon the merits of the issue.
A number of Supreme Court and lower court rulings intervening between the Selective Draft cases of 1918 and the
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940" * have established
that decisional law holds to date that exemption from bearing
arms because of religious scruples is a matter of congressional
grace and not a constitutional right whose inviolability is
guaranteed by the first amendment. Historically, there is
much that is debatable and on either side of the question, a
position of inference may be drawn neither of which may be
said to be conclusively persuasive. The fragmentary and summary accounts of the debates on the consicentious objector
in the first Annals of Congress which formulated the Bill of
Rights leads us to no certainty on the matter. It was thought
of and discussed and dropped for the legislatures to decide
as a matter "of benevolence "-whether that benevolence was
a tactical posture to counter all practical objections or a denial
of constitutional right cannot be settled with any degree of
33. In an earlier ruling, the Supreme Court took direct cognizance of the
relation of the Thirteenth Amendment to duties that a government may
impose upon those within its jurisdiction. See Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S.
328, 333 (1916):
"It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of services always treated
as exceptional, and certainly was not intended to interdict enforcement
of those duties which individuals owe to the State, such as services in
the army, militia, on the jury, etc. The great purpose in view was
liberty under the protection of effective government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of essential powers."
84. 54 Stat. 885.
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certainty. The House amendment to the proposed federal
draft act of 1814 provided exemption from conscription for
the conscientious objector who was scrupulous of bearing
arms because of his affiliation with a religious sect. This may
indicate, on the one hand, that the Congress of 1814 did not
think that the first amendment provided such a protective
coverage for the dissenter, and, on the other, it may be that the
House took upon itself to resolve what the first Congress did
not resolve. How much of the widespread opposition to the
contemplated conscription act of 1814, which never actually
became law, and in particular the strongly worded remonstrance against it by the Hartford Convention express what
the constitutional law was understood to be or should be is
again an unresolved question. The provision for substitution
or exemption upon payment of $300.00 in the conscription
law of 1863 may be used as an argument for either side. It
might indicate a constitutional right to exemption conditioned
by some compensatory action or it simply affirms the right
of the government to require a certain number of servicemen
no matter how forthcoming. The emendation of a year later
in the Act of February 24, 1864 which allowed the dissenter
the alternate of noncombat service again does not settle for
either side. Court rulings however have been less hesitant
in affirming that exemption from bearing arms because of
conscientious scruples is dependent upon the grace of benevolence of the legislature. A chronological study of the Supreme
Court and lower court rulings on issues which indirectly or
directly bear upon the conscientious objector will disclose that
the predominating and still prevailing judicial doctrine is
the emphasis upon the general duty to defend the fatherland
as against the protest of the dissenting conscience and the
gradual elevation of the dissenting conscience to greater
significant notice and inviolability but within the context of
a congressional grace.
United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929)
In 1929 the Supreme Court ruled that an applicant for
naturalization could be denied her request because of her paciPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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according to the provisions of the Naturali-

zation Act of 1906."
That it is the duty of citizens by force of arms to defend our government against all enemies whenever
necessity arises is a fundamental principle of the
Constitution. (ibid. at 650)
Whatever tends to lessen the willingness of citizens
to discharge their duty to bear arms in the country's
defense detracts from the strength and safety of the
Government. And their opinions and beliefs as well
as their behavior indicating a disposition to hinder
in the performance of that duty are subjects of inquiry under the statutory provisions governing naturalization and are of vital importance, for if all or
a large number of citizens oppose such defense the
"good order and happiness" of the United States
can not long endure. (ibid. at 650, 651.)
The fact that she is an uncompromising pacifist with
no sense of nationalism but only a cosmic sense of belonging to the human family justifies belief that she
may be opposed to the use of military force as contemplated by our Constitution and laws. And her
testimony clearly suggests that she is disposed to
exert her power to influence others to such opposition.
A pacifist in the general sense of the word is one
who seeks to maintain peace and to abolish war. Such
purposes are in harmony with the Constitution and
policy of our Government. But the word is also used
and understood to mean one who refuses or is unwilling for any purpose to bear arms because of conscientious considerations and who is disposed to encourage
others in such refusal. And one who is without any
sense of nationalism is not well bound or held by the
ties of affection to any nation or government. Such
persons are liable to be incapable of the attachment
for and devotion to the principles of our Constitution
that is required of aliens seeking naturalization.
(ibid. at 651, 652)
35. United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929).
36. U.S.C. Title 8, § 381.
"He (the applicant for naturalization) shall, before he is admitted to
citizenship, declare on oath in open court . . . that he will support and
defend the Constitution and laws of the United States against all
enemies, foreign and domestic, and bear true faith and allegiance to
the same."
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Apart from the fact that the applicant for naturalization was a woman forty-nine years of age, a most improbable
subject to be called upon to bear arms in defense of the
United States, the reasoning of the Court discloses an undefined but none the less overly alarming fear of the corrosive
effect of pacifism upon devotion to the Constitution and upon
fellow citizens. Though free speech was not the issue before
the Court, the Court's premonitions that the applicant "is
disposed to exert her power to influence others to such opposition (to war)" discloses the Court's mind on the efficacy of
speech to be in accord with its earlier rulings under the
Espionage Act of 1917 and the state criminal anarchy statutes."7
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931)
Two years later, the Supreme Court, on a five to four split,
ruled that Douglas Macintosh, a Canadian by birth and a professor of theology at Yale, whose application for naturalization had been declined by the lower courts, could not be admitted because, though not a pacifist, he would not give a
definite pledge in advance to fight in any war in which the
country should engage."8 In response to the query of the Naturalization Act of 1906, "Are you willing to bear arms in defense of the United States ?", he wrote: "Yes, but I should
want to be free to judge of the necessity." Macintosh clearly
sets forth the apparent antimony between a claim of inviolability of conscience on the bearing of arms and the general
patriotic duty to come to the defense of the fatherland. The
question is with whom does the ultimate decision on the
righteousness of war rest ?
37. Notably the Schenck (1919), Frohwerk (1919), Debs (1919), Abrams
(1919), Gitlow (1925), Whitney (1927) Cases.
The dissenting opinion, written by Justice Holmes and concurred in by
Justice Brandeis, was quick to distinguish such fears of influence in wartime from those that the Court and shared in Schenck. Cf. id. at 654, 655.
38. The Naturalization Act #4, 34 Stat. 596 (1906).
39. In a memorandum, Macintosh stated:
I am willing to do what I judge to be in the best interests of my
country, but only in so far as I can believe that this is not going to
be against the best interests of humanity in the long run. I do not
undertake to support "my country, right or wrong" in any dispute
which may arise, and I am not willing to promise beforehand, and
without knowing the cause for which my country may go to war,
either that I will or that I will not "take up arms in defense of this
country", however, "necessary" the war may seem to be to the Gov-
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The Macintosh case is clearly distinguishable from the
earlier Schwimmer case. In the latter case, there was an apparent contrariety between an uncompromising pacifism and
the duty implied in the manifold benefits that a citizen enjoyed under the Constitution to fight if necessary for its
survival. Actually, the Court in Schwimmer veered more to
the bad tendency latent in a free speech advocacy of pacifism.
In Macintosh the Court was confronted with the age-old problem of ultimate and absolute allegiances, to God and to country,
and in this instance, it was not an abstract question, but concretely, the United States of America with high credentials as
a democratic and generally speaking, a beneficent governance. We must note that though Macintosh is a conscientious
objector case, it is not the customary one. To begin with, he is
not a citizen of the United States but seeks citizenship. Further, he is not objecting to all wars-he had served as a chaplain of the Canadian Expeditionary Force in World War Ibut more precisely, he refuses to commit himself a priori to
underwrite the moral righteousness of any war in which
America may be a participant and to bear arms at her calling.
In a word, he claims the right of conscience to be a selective
conscientious objector as a citizen of the United States. While
he was anticipating the more common issue of today, that of
the selective conscientious objector, he was at the same time
proceeding from a less firm position, that of an applicant to
citizenship, a privilege which the American government need
not "bargain" about with any alien.
Justice Sutherland gave the majority opinion denying the
right to citizenship:
In effect, he offers to take the oath of allegiance only
with the qualification that the question whether the
war is necessary or morally justified must, so far as
his support is concerned, be conclusively determined
by reference to his opinion.
When he speaks of putting his allegiance to the will
of God above his allegiance to the government, it is
evident, in the light of his entire statement, that he
means to make his own interpretation of the will of
ernment of the day. Cf. United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605,
618 (1931). Professor Macintosh had served as a chaplain in the
Canadian Expeditionary Force during World War 1.
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God the decisive test which shall conclude the government and stay its hand. We are a Christian people according to one another the equal right of religious

freedom, and acknowledging with reverence the duty
of obedience to the will of God.
But, also, we are a nation with the duty to survive;
a nation whose constitution contemplates war as well
as peace; whose government must go forward upon
the assumption, and safely can proceed upon no other,
that unqualified allegiance to the nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the land, as well
those made for war as those made for peace, are not
inconsistent with the will of God.
The applicant here rejects that view. He is unwilling
to rely, as every native-born citizen is obliged to do,
upon the probable continuance of Congress of the long
established and approved practice of exempting the
honestly conscientious objector, while at the same
time asserting his willingness to conform to whatever

the future law constitutionally shall require of him;
but discloses a present and fixed purpose to refuse to
give his moral or armed support to any future war in
which the country may be actually engaged, if, in his
opinion, the war is not morally justified, the opinion
of the nation as expressed by Congress to the contrary
notwithstanding....
It is not within the province of the courts to make
bargains with those who seek naturalization. They

must accept the grant and take the oath in accordance
with the terms fixed by law, or forego the privilege

of citizenship. There is no middle choice. If one
qualification of the oath be allowed, the door is open
for others, with utter confusion as the probable final
result.
There is no intimation of any probability of an unjust
war by the United States, but rather, on the contrary, the unquestioned deference to be shown to the morally unfailing
democratic process by which a nation is committed through
congressional declaration of war. It may be that America
is viewed as the light of the world. Communism and Facism
had already emerged on the Continent as a threat to the European democracies and the awesome lesson of the Nuremburg
was still in the future. But as far as the constitutional issue
Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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was concerned-could Macintosh invoke a constitutional right
under the first amendment to refuse to bear arms because of
religious conscientious objections ? Macintosh states unequivocally for the first time the doctrine which to this date has persisted and seems likely to endure unchanged that exemption
from military service because of religious scruples is not a
constitutional right but a matter of congressional grace.
This, if it means what it seems to say, is an astonishing statement. Of course, there is no such principle
of the Constitution, fixed or otherwise. The conscientious objector is relieved from the obligation to bear
arms in obedience to no constitutional provision, express or implied, but because, and only because, it has
accorded with the policy of the Congress thus to relieve him. The alien, when he becomes a naturalized
citizen, acquires, with one exception, every right possessed under the Constitution by those citizens who
are native born .... The privilege of the native-born
conscientious objector, to avoid bearing arms comes
not from the Constitution but from the acts of Congress. That body may grant or withhold the exemption
as in its wisdom it sees fit; and if it be withheld, the
native-born conscientions objector cannot successfully assert that privilege. No other conclusion is
compatable with the well-nigh limitless extent of the
war powers as above illustrated, which include, by
necessary implication, the power, in the last extremity, to compel the armed service of any citizen in the
land, without regard to his objections or his views in
respect to the justice or morality of the particular
war in general. 40
The startling fact of the majority opinion in Macintosh is its
affirmation about the "well-nigh limitless extent of the war
powers. "
From its very nature, the war power, when necessity
calls for its exercise, tolerates no qualifications of
limitations, unless found in the Constitution or in applicable principles of international law. " '
Chief Justice Evans Hughes gave the celebrated minority
opinion concurred in by Justice Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone.
The majority opinion upheld the constitutionality of the
40. 283 U.S. at 623-24.
41. Id. at 622.
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Naturalization Act even while understanding its requirement
of a promise to bear arms to be unconditional and absolute.
The dissenting opinion, on the contrary, would not call into
question the constitutionality of the Naturalization Act because it read its commitment to bear arms not to be absolute,
but rather a requirement subject to higher moral imperatives,
a supposition demanded by the constitutional guarantee of
religious liberty of conscience.
While it has always been recognized that the supreme
power of the government may be exerted and disobedience to its commands may be punished, we know
that with many of our worthy citizens it would be a
most heartsearching question if they were asked whether they would promise to obey a law believed to be in
conflict with religious duty. Many of their most
honored exemplars in the past have been willing to
suffer imprisonment or even death rather than
make such a promise. And we also know, in particular, that a promise to engage in war by bearing arms,
or thus to engage in a war believed to be unjust would
be contrary to the tenets of religious groups among
our citizens who are of patriotic purpose and exemplary conduct ....
Much has been said of the paramount duty to the state, a duty to be recognized, it is
urged, even though it conflicts with convictions of
duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists
within the domains of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When
one's beliefs collides with the power of the state, the
latter is supreme within its sphere and submission
or punishment follows. But, in the forum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state
has always been maintained. The reservation of that
supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would
unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious
and law-abiding citizens.
The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God
involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation ....
One cannot speak of religious
liberty, with proper appreciation of its essential and
historic significance, without assuming the existence
of a belief in supreme allegiance to the will of God.
Professor Macintosh, when pressed by the inquiries
put to him, stated what is axiomatic in a religious docPublished by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970
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trine. And, putting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity, freedom of conscience itself
implies respect for an innate conviction of paramount
duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought
and won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in conflict with good order, upon
the very ground of the supremacy of conscience within its proper field. What that field is, under our system of government, presents in part a question of
constitutional law and also, in part, one of legislative
policy in avoiding unnecessary clashes with the dictates of conscience. There is abundant room for enforcing the requisite authority of the law as it is
enacted and requiring obedience, and for maintaining
the conception of the supremacy of law as essential to
orderly government, without demanding that either
citizens or applicants for citizenship shall assume
by oath an obligation to regard allegiance to God as
subordinate to allegiance to civil power.42 (emphasis
supplied.)
At this point, it is well to bring into focus and note how
much that is said in opposition is not disowned but rather resolves into a coherent, complementary proposition. Morally,
the conflict between patriotic duty to defend the country and,
on the other, to be true to the dictates of conscience in obedience
to God, is complicated by the fact that in either claim of duty
there is a presumption of moral correctness, a supposition of
course that is rebuttable. We shall have to return to this
moral problematic in the concluding part of our discourse
which will inquire into the polarity of claims of conscience
and of the moral-legal claims of a political community upon
its citizens. For the present, we make these observations:
exemption from military service for scruples of conscience is
by congressional grace. Since Macintosh this proposition has
not been brought into doubt by the Supreme Court nor by any
lower court. However startling it is to read of the limitless
extent of the war powers, salus populi, suprema lex, remains
broadly an uncontested affirmation. It is within these two
positions that in fact the courts have worked out to the present
decisional law on conscientious objectors. Granting the congressional provisions for conscientious objectors, the prefer42. Id. at 633-634.
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ential status formerly given to theistic believers, has by now
since the construction of no-establishment in Everson and of
novel latitudinarian meaning of religion to adumbrate nontheistic beliefs since Torcaso and Seegar, the right of government to compel every able bodied person to participate in a
war effort somehow-either by assignment to noncombatant
service in the military or to civilian service outside the military-remains undiminished. And we may well conjecture
whether with all the moralizing and legal thinking, it has been
the realism of the situation that makes possible the course of
moral and legal development on the conscientious objector.
Namely, there is abundantroom (in the words of the dissenting
opinion)-there is the pragmatic experience that in time of
war, a government can rely upon the patriotism of its people
for a sufficiency of military manpower both from voluntary
and coercive enlistment with all the numerical allowances
made for the exempted conscientious objector. The only alternate is a morally justifiable resistence and insurrection
against a government committed to war.
Though the 6 to 3 majority of Schwimnmer dwindled in
two years to a 5 to 4 in Macintosh (and Bland), it was not
until fifteen years later that the dissenting opinions would
emerge for the majority in Girouard v. United States." The
Court, in effect, reversed the three earlier 4 cases, by holding
that Girouard may be admitted to citizenship because he was
willing to take the oath of allegiance and to serve in the army
as a non-combatant, but who, because of his religious scruples
-he was a Seventh Day Adventist-was unwilling to bear
arms. The Court reasoned a maiore ad minorem by noting
43.
44.

328 U.S. 61 (1946).
There are slight discrepancies between Schwimmer, Macintosh, and Girouard
which do not affect the substantial basic issue. Schwimmer was a woman,
who is not traditionally inducted into military service in the United States.
Besides, the naturalization act of 1906 had not specifically required willingness to bear arms in the defense of the country but literally, an oath of allegiance and support, a provision, however, which the Supreme Court construed to an equivalence to the bearing of arms, and equivalence further
debilitated by the Court's fear that the Hungarian pacifist's use of free
speech against war might influence the duty of patriotism of others. Macintosh was willing to take the oath to "support and defend the Constitutional
laws of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic", provided he reserved to himself to judge of its necessity and morality. Girouard
prescinded from the issue raised by Macintosh and was content to limit his
duty to defense to noncombatant service in the army. The Girouard ruling
simply reversed the narrow statutory construction of the Naturalization Act.
In Macintosh with a non-absolutist interpretation which allowed alternate
service.

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

33

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 10

620

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

that similar religious scruples would not bar a citizen from
public office, that of congressman not excluded, and surely,
the national legislature could not have intended stricter requirements for aliens requesting citizenship than for public
officials who legislate and administer law. In 1950 the Court
went further and would admit to citizenship a man who would
not serve in the Army in any capacity. " Strictly speaking,
the Girouardruling does not of course deny that Congress has
the right to require military service as a prerequisite for
naturalization but rather conditions it with alternate equivalents with due regard for the immunity of conscience guaranteed by the religious clauses of the first amendment.
Intervening Lower Federal Court Reasonings
Conducive to the Seeger decision of 1965
Deference to rights of conscience is a sensitivity which
American law has gradually and in increasing extensions
reached to a variety of claims. But in almost all such protests
of conscientious scruples a limit is set that somehow subordinates an absolute immunity to the interests of national security
or in a weighing of interests a superior claim of general welfare. This is noted for example in the concurring opinion of
Mr. Justice Cardozo in Hamilton v. Regents of the University
of California," who notes that the exercise of private judg45. Cohnstaedt v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 339 U.S. 901 (1950).
By the Immigration and Naturalization Act of June 27, 1952 (66 Stat. 163),
which codified much previous legislation, terminated the policy of denying
the privilege of naturalization to conscientious objectors. The present controlling law on conscientious objectors cf. 8 U.S.C. 1451 (c) : "(5) (A) to
bear arms on behalf of the United States when required by law, or (B) to
perform noncombatant service in the Armed Forces of the United States
when required by law, or (C) to perform of national importance under
civilian direction when required by law."
Hamilton v. Regents of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245 (1934)
is interesting for the conditions and limitations that may be set to a
conscientious objector short of the requirements of war. It distinguishes
a circumstance of grace, the benevolence of free higher education provided
for under the Morrill Act of 1862 in Federal land-grant colleges, to which
no one is obliged by law, with the requirement of compulsory instruction in
military science unaccompanied by any pledge of military service from
military service.
Even so, the Federal government leaves it up to each state how to comply
with the Morrill Act requirement of military training. States may require
it absolutely as a condition for admission in these Federal land-grant
colleges or allow an alternate course, v.g. in physical exercise, for those
opposed to any instruction in arms, and provide some other training that
would prepare the student for noncombatant service in time of war.
46.
In controversies of this order courts do not concern themselves with
matters of legislative policy, unrelated to privileges or liberties secured
by the organic law ....
Instruction in military science is not instruction
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ment is not beyond all restriction. Similarly, the exercise of
free speech and press in times of war will undoubtedly be
subordinated to national security and defense whatever the
reappraisal in retrospect of the reality of the dangers to the
national war effort and of the appropriate canon of constitutional construction of "danger" in the first World War
cases. 7 Be that as it may, the duty to participate in the defense of the nation in someway, provided for by the national
compulsory military training and service, is evident in the
very provisions on conscientious objectors-there is to be
some form of authoritatively stipulated and assignable service.
There is no constitutional right to exemption and the mandatory alternates to actual combat service underscore what Macintosh and succeeding court rulings have established as a
principle beyond doubt. But there has been a gradual enlargement of the category of the conscientious objector from the
first World War Draft Act of 1917, which provided for conscientious objectors who were members of "any well-recogin the practice or tenets of a religion. Neither directly or indirectly is
government establishing a state religion when it insists upon any such
training. Instruction in military science, unaccompanied here by any
pledge of military service, is not an interference by the state with the
free exercise of religion when the liberties of the constitution are read
in the light of a century and a half of history during the days of peace
and war.
Manifestly a different doctrine would carry us to lengths that have
never yet been dreamed of. The conscientious objector, if his liberties
were to be extended, might refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of
a war, whether for attack or for defense, or in furtherance of any
other and condemned by his conscience as irreligious or immoral. The
right of private judgment has never yet been so exalted above the
powers and the compulsion of the agencies of government. One who is
a martyr to a principle-which may turn out in the end to be a
delusion or an error-does not prove by his martyrdom that he has
kept within the law.
293 U.S. 245, at 268 (1934). Justices Brandeis and Stone concurred in
this opinion.
47. Notably, Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919), Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919), Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919),
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), Schaefer v. United States,
251 U.S. 466 (1920), Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920), Gitlow v.
New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925), Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927).
48. Cf. In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) State of Illinois Bar Committee on
character and fitness recommended that Summers not be allowed to practice
law in Illinois because Summers would not swear to support and defend the
constitution of Illinois by arms. Summers based his refusal on grounds of
religious conscience but the United States Supreme Court upheld the decision
of Supreme Court of Illinois on the basis of the Macintosh and Hamilton
rationale and in effect rejecting the plea that the refusal to bear arms
because of religious scruples was protected by the religious clauses of the
First Amendment. The dissenting opinion of Justice Black concurred in by
Justices Murphy, Douglas, and Rutledge, would have allowed Summers'
plea a consideration under the First Amendment religious liberty clause.
That the dissenting opinion of Justice Black may have disposed the Court
the following year to the Girouard construction of the Naturalization Act
may be indicated by the narrow margin of 5 to 4 re Summers.
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nied sect or organization.., whose creed or principles forbid
its members to participate in war in any form", to a consideration of the religious scruples of one not a member in a recognized pacifist sect by the broader terms of an Executive
Order." Durin gthe congressional committee hearings on the
Burke-Wadsworth Conscription Bill in 194011 witnesses urged
exemption for non-theistic conscientious scruples against the
bearing of arms of those who were affiliated with organizations committed to pacifist profession and on such nonreligious grounds. It seems that the affiliation with a publicly
noted organization as a test or ostensible sign of sincerity of
conscientious protest was undoubted on both sides, the theist
and non-theist rule of conscience. Though the argument for
members of non-theist pacifist organizations did not then prevail, the outcome of the Seeger case fifteen years later was to
allow for the non-theist without any such membership the
same identical protection given to the theist-grounded scruples
under the religious clause of the first amendment by an
apparently arbitrary enlargements of the conventional meaning of religion. To this end-result, lower federal court opinions contributed by setting in oppisition contrary constructions of religious scruples, an opposition which the Supreme
Court in Seeger would resolve by affirming that there may
be no opposition before the law between the ultimate determinants of different individual consciences.
Lower Federal Court Construction of "Religion"
The Burke-Wadsworth Conscription Bill was enacted
prior to the American entry into World War II and is known
as the Selective Training and Service Act of 1940.1 The religious scruples against the bearing of arms obviously would
rest on the religious liberty clause of the first amendment.
But the objector whose conscientious scruples were not rooted
in theistic belief could only hope to gain equal consideration
49. Executive Order No. 2823, March 20, 1918, which, while stipulating the
non-combatant services to which objectors could be assigned, extended the
exemption to include those who, although they were not members of "any
well recognized sect or organization" opposed to the bearing of arms, were
motivated by personal religious dictates against service in the armed forces.
50. Cf. Hearings on S. 4164 before the Senate Committee on Military Affairs,
76th Congress, 3d Sess. 1 (1940): Hearings on H. R. 10132 before the
House Committee on Military Affairs, 76th Congress 3d Sess. 1, (1940).
51. 54 Stat. 885.
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before the law by charging preferential treatment of the
theistic protestor in violation of the no establishment clause.
Nonetheless, despite the basic reasonableness of their rationale,
the Act of 1940 only broadened its allowance for exemption
from combat training those whose objections were related to
religious training and belief.5 2 The Act did not limit exemption
to members of recognized pacifist sects, but rather extended it
to any person "who, by reason of religious training and belief,
is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any
form." It in effect legislated what had been permissible during World War I by virtue of the broad terminology of the
Executive Order that implemented the 1917 Draft Act. It was,
however, an improvement upon the precedent in another regard,-surrogate civilian service was now placed under civilian direction and as a corollary removed the conscientious
objector assigned to these civilian tasks from military supervision and from military court martial proceedings. The disengagement of religious scruples from a required affiliation
to a historic pacifist sect would of course remove the presumption of an objective test of sincerity. What was now required
in order to allow the same claim of subjective conscience for
the non-theist was either to reverse the Macintosh ruling that
exemption was by congressional grace and affirm it to be a
constitutional right under the first amendment or, somehow
adumbrate under "religion" the nontheistic claim of conscience in order to avoid the challenge to establishment of
religion in diminution of the religious liberty clause. These
prima facie antinomies were to emerge in fact in lower federal
court reasonings and rulings in a polarization between the
narrow and broad construction of the meaning of "religion"
and so force eventually the Supreme Court to resolve this
crucial problem. And so in fact it came about.
The first breach in the traditional meaning of religion
which the Congress and the courts53 had consistently adhered
The Act of 1940 was the first peacetime selective service law with emphasis on training. Its provision for exemption read: "Nothing contained in
this act shall be construed to require any person to subject to combatant
training who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously
opposed to participating in any form." Ch. 720, #5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
53. In addition to the state and federal statutes (to which we have already
referred) that consistently understand religion to be as Jefferson had
expressed it "the relations which exist between man and his Maker, and
the duties resulting from those relations". Cf. Costanzo, THIS NATION
52.
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to even against mounting pressures against the narrow construction of the definition of "religion" occurred in 1943, in
United States v. Kauten,5 4 when Justice Augustus Hand set
forth one of those dicta that eventually courses its way into
constitutionality." Kauten had refused to report for induction
as required by the Selective Service Act of 1940. His objections to military conscription were not based on religious
grounds nor for that matter on moral claims of conscience as
he might have done so even as an atheist. Rather, he charged
that the American involvement in the war was President
Roosevelt's way of coping with the rising rate of unemployment. Obviously, since his protest was political, he could not
claim exemption under the religious conscientious objector
provisions of the Selective Service Act, and in fact, the circuit
court ruled against him. Nonetheless, Judge Augustus Hand
in the course of his opinion proceeded without any necessity
for the disposition of the case and, contrary to the clear intent
of Congress, 6 to reconstruct the federal statute broadly so that
"religious" "take into account the characteristics of a skeptical generation and make the existence of a conscientious
scruple against war in any form, rather than allegiance to a
definite religious group or creed, the basis of the exemption.""
It is interesting to note that Judge Augustus Hand would uphold the legitimacy of a nontheistic moral claim against all
wars hut does not allow that a selective conscientious objection-to a particular war-is deserving of equal consideration.
Rather, he strongly intimates that generally speaking objection to a particular war is more likely than not political. He
concludes with the proposition that is later adopted in the
Seeger ruling of 1965 which equates the ultimate non-theistic
(Herder and Herder
1964); the Supreme Court rulings which understood "religion" in this manGod relationship are Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342, (1890), Church of
the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), Macintosh v.
United States, 283 U.S. 605, (1931), dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes at 633-34.
133 F.2d 703 (2d. Cir. 1943).
Such for example as the dictum in Everson denying any financial aid in
any form, in any amount to religion which the Court subsequently refused
to consider merely a dictum.
Cf. supra note 50.
Cf. supra note 54, at 708. The relevant statutory provision reads:
"Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to require any person
to be subject to combatant training who, by reason of religious training
and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participating in war in any
form."
Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720 #5(g), 54 Stat. 889.
UNDER GOD, CHURCH, STATE, AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICA,

54.
55.
56.
57.
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conscientious persuasion to conscientious scruples related to
thiestic dogmas. 8
Judge Hand's dictum in Kauten must have impressed his
associate justices because that same year, the same court of
appeals ruled in United States ex rel. Phillips v. Downer"
that a stricter view than that expressed by Judge Hand,
namely, that which demanded a belief sanctioned by one of the
historic peace churches, would restore in essence the requirement of the Act of 1917 which the 1940 Act deliberately set out
to amend. An analysis of the circuit court's reasoning will
disclose that it was more distinguished for its enlightening
and expansive mood than for its accuracy. A reading of the
Hearings on the proposed Selective Service Act of 19400
reveals that the congressional committees pointedly rejected
to allow nonreligious protests against war, couched in philosophical and humanitarian terms, to be eligible for exemption
from combat service. But the Circuit Court nonetheless was
ready to denote philosophical and humanitarian conscientious
objections as "religious"-contrary to a consistent traditional
use by the courts themselves up to that time of "religious" as
connoting theism; further, to identify arbitrarily the "religious" with church membership, and thirdly, by this unjustifiable device, read into the 76th Congress, an intent contrary
to their very explicit distinction between the religious scruples
against the bearing of arms unrelated to membership (which
the Congress now wished to include among the exempted) and
the religious protestor who was a member of a historic paci6
'fist sect to whom alone the 1917 Act restricted the exemption. '
58.

Cf.
59. 135
141
60. Cf.
61. 135

There is a distinction between a course of reasoning resulting in a
conviction that a particular war is inexpedient or disastrous and a
conscientious objection to participation in any war under any circumstances. The latter, and not the former, may be the basis or exemption
under the Act. The former is usually a political objection, while the
latter, we think may justly be regarded as a response of the individual
to an inward mentor, call it conscience or God, that is for many persons
at the present time the equivalent of what has always been thought
a religious impulse.
supra note 54 at 709.
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943). See too, United States ex rel. Reel v. Badt,
F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944).
supra, note 50.
F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943) at 524:
But if a stricter rule than was announced in the Kauten case is called
for, one demanding a belief which cannot be found among the philosophers but only among religious teachers of recognized organizations,
then we are substantially, or nearly back to the requirement of the
Act of 1917 of membership in a well-recognized religious sect or organi-
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So it was that the second circuit of appeals reasoned by an intellectually uncomfortable amalgam of an innovation in lexicography, by a contrary to fact reconstruction of congressional
intent, and by an unreflecting identity of the "religious" with
a church-member.
Three years later, the court of appeals of the Ninth Circuit was confronted with same problem in Berman v. United
States 2 and after deliberating at length on the dictum of
Kauten refused to adopt it. Judge Stephens noted the similarity, at least in principle, between the situations in the
Second Circuit cases and in Berman and immediately stated
that the court took "divergent views from those expressed
in those cases." The court correctly read the congressional
intent in the provision "of religious training and belief" to
mean training in theistic beliefs and related this meaning to
the double purpose that the 76th Congress embodied in the
statute, namely, to distinguish between the nontheistic moralist objection to war and the religious, that is, a dictate of conscience related "to an authority higher and beyond any
worldly one.""3 These latter the Congress of 1940 wished now
to include within the coverage of exemption whether or not
they were affiliated with a pacific church or not. In a word,
the Ninth Circuit court noted the obvious that had unaccountably escaped the Second Circuit court, namely, the statute of
1940 was drawing a distinction precisely to provide exemption for the religious, i.e. theistic, scruples of one not a member of a historic pacifist church, and to distinguish such a
one from the objector on merely philosophical, sociological or'
moral grounds, whose belief did not relate to a deity, and not
to include the latter within the exemption because he was not
zation whose existing creed or principles forbid its members to participate in war in any form.
62. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
63.
It is our opinion that the expression "by reason of religious training
and belief" is plain language, and was written into the statue, for the
specific purpose of distinguishing between a conscientious social belief,
or a sincere devotion to a high moralistic philosophy, and one based
upon an individual's belief in his responsibility to an authority higher
and beyond any worldly one .... There are those who have a philosophy
of life, and who live up to it. There is evidence that this is so in regard
to appellant. However, no matter how pure and admirable this standard
may be, and no matter how devotedly he adheres to it, his philosophy
and morals and social policy without the concept of deity cannot be
said to be religion.
Id. at 380-81.
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a "religious" objector within the meaning of the statute. The
6 4 and left the antinomy
Supreme Court refused certiorari
between the Second and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal to
Congress to settle.
The 80th Congress responded to the Court's inaction on
the Kauten-Berman antinomy by unequivocally agreeing that
Berman had indeed correctly understood its "plain language"
and "specific purpose" of the 1940 statute. In order to dispel
any further ingenious reconstruction of its intent such as the
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had forged in Kauten and
Downer, it specifically defined the meaning of "religious
training and belief," something the Congress had not bothered
to do"5 because supposedly it was intelligible in the traditional
context of religion as related to Deity, as the Courts themselves
had until then so understood.
Religious training and belief in this connection mean
an individual's belief in relation to a Supreme Being
involving duties superior to those arising from any
human relation, but does not include essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code."
But if the Selective Service Act of 1948 determined to
abide by the traditional meaning of religion, those whose
moral convictions were not theistically grounded and were
accordingly excluded from the congressional grace extended
to the religious scruples of theists, now shifted their tact and
challenged the constitutionality of the statutory provision by
raising claims under the guarantees of the First Amendment,
64. Cf. supra at 62.
65. Cf. supra note 57.
66. Section 6(j), 62 Stat. 612 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. #456(j), 1958. We may
note here that while both the 1940 and 1948 statutes speak of both
"religious training and belief" both the courts and Congress have not
followed the lead of Justice Stephens who stressed the requirement of
"religious training" no less than "belief" in Berman.
Cf. Universal Military Training and Service Act, 62 Stat. 609 (1948), 50
U.S.C. App. 4#451-73 (1958). In fact, the congressional explanation of
"religious training and belief" really only defines what Congress understands "belief" to be while actually being entirely mute on the meaning of
"religious training". In 1948 one night reasonably find corroborating
evidence of congressional meaning of "religious" from the 1940 and 1948
provisions for ministerial exemption which patently favored theistic believers as against non-believers. But in the light of the Seeger ruling in 1965,
such an interrelated rationale ceases to be meaningful. The statutory ministerial exemption is surely by now, consequent to Torcaso and Seegerconstitutionally sui generis and must be upheld by a reasoning unique to
itself.
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issues which until then, had emerged before the court only indirectly 7 and were either summarily dismissed or met by
collateral considerations other than those of the religious
clauses of the First Amendment.
During the decade and a half following the 1948 Draft
Act, the Second, Third"8 and Ninth Circuits construed the
statute in keeping with the criteria set down in Berman and
adopted by Congress in the Draft Act of 1948. Both the Second
and Ninth Circuits upheld the constitutionality of the 1948
amendments against First Amendment challenges. In 1952,
the Ninth Circuit court was confronted with the charge that
the exemption provision of the 1948 Draft Act was an interference with the religious liberty clause or a violation of the
no-establishment prohibition of the First Amendment. Here
surely would have arisen the opportunity to challenge the
Supreme Being clause by pointing to the statutory preference
of theistic believeing conscientious objectors over non theistic
protestors. But the fact that the defendant was a believer in
God denied him the personal claim to make such an assault
upon the constitutionality of the exemption provision. 9 Nonetheless, the court chose to discourse about the constitutionality
of the exemption as restricted to theistic believers and argued
67. For example, in Kramer v. United States, 245 U.S. 478 (1918) the defendant's conscientious objection to the 1917 Draft Act was not based on
religious grounds but on philosophical, social, or humanitarian persuasions.
Consequently the first amendment religious guarantees were not apparently
directly before the Court. But when earlier, in Arver v. United States
(Selective Draft Law Cases), 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the challenge was made
that the 1917 Act was in violation of the First Amendment because by its
ministerial exemptions the conscription act was establishing or interfering
with religion, the Court summarily rejected it out of hand as not deserving
serious consideration. "We think its unsoundness is too apparent to require
us to do more." Id. at 390. In Macintosh, the Court could do no better
with the defendant's claim of conscience than to point to the "limitless
extent of the war powers" . . . which include, by necessary implication, the
power, in the last extremity, to compel the armed services of any citizen
in the land, without regard to his objections or his views in respect to the
justice or morality of the particular war in general." United States v.
Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, at 624 (1931). In Schwimmer (1929) the claim of
conscience was swallowed up in the bad tendency of the exercise of free
speech upon the wartime obligations. In Hamilton (1934) the conscientious
protest was engulfed in the bad tendency of an unabridged exercise of
private judgment. In Girouard (1946) and Cohnstaedt (1950), the claim
of conscience was met by a broadened statutory construction of the Immigration and Naturalization Service laws, in a reversal of Macintosh, Bland,
and Schwimmer rulings.
68. In United States v. De Lime, 233 F.2d 96 3d Cir. 1955) the defendant,
by his own avowal, an agnostic, could hardly sustain his claim in accordance
with the congressional statutory explanation of "religious training and
belief" as related to the individual's belief to a Supreme Being.
69. George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 452 (9th Cir.). Cert. denied, 334
U.S. 843 (1952).

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/10

42

Costanzo: Conscription and the Conscientious Objectors

1971

CONSCRIPTION AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

629

that since the exemption was a matter of legislative benevolence and not of constitutional right, the Congress could set
conditions to the exemption at will. Since arbitrary determination might import unreasonableness, as the court itself
allowed,'" such a view would be of doubtful validity in the light
of the Speiser ruling of 1958.1'
Though the Court had disposed of the challenge to the
constitutionality of the discriminatory exemption of the act
of 1948, on the Macintosh doctrine of legislative grace and discretionary selectivity, it did nonetheless, take cognizance of
the defendant's charge that the exemption provisions did
violence to the religious clauses of the First Amendment. The
Court pointed to the fact that Congress had formally adopted
in 1948 the traditional meaning of "religion" as generally
understood "in American society" "and the manner in which
it has been defined by courts," namely, "in terms of the relationship of the individual to a Supreme Being." Such a
clear understanding underlying "religious training and belief" was easily distinguishable from "political, sociological,
philosophical and ethical grounds for opposing the war," and
the Congress, even prescinding from the plenary power to
provide for the defense of the country, to which the Supreme
Court had referred in Macintosh, could make a discriminatory
classification based upon that distinction without offending
the due process clause. 2
Four years later, the Ninth Circuit court was directly
confronted with the constitutional issue posed by the First
Amendment in Clark v. United States.' The defendant had
70. "It is established constitutional doctrine of long standing that exemptions
of this character do not spring from the constitution but from the Congress. . . . This being so, there is brought into play the familiar principle
that whatever the Government, State or Federal, may take away altogether,
it may grant only on certain conditions. Otherwise put, whatever the Govvernment may forbid altogether, it may condition even unreasonable." Id.
at 449-50.
71. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). Supreme Court would not allow
a veteran's property tax exemption to be conditioned by a loyalty oath as
required by Articles XIII and XX of the California Constitution. See too
the companion cases, First Unitarian Church v. Los Angeles, Valley Unitarian-Universalist Church, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 357 U.S. 545 (1958), disposed of on the same grounds as Speiser. The churches had contended that
to condition property tax exemption accorded to churches upon the required
disclaimer of forbidden advocacy was a denial of due process.
72. Cf. supra note 69 at 451-452.
73. Clark v. United States, 236 F.2d 13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 882
(1956).
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been denied exemption from military service because he had
not based his scruples upon belief in God. He buttressed his
argument by adding to the guarantees of the religious clauses
of the First Amendment, the proscription of a "religious test"
provision of Article VI of the Constitution. The circuit court
dispensed with the appeal to the First Amendment by referring to its own ruling in George and discounted the invocation
of Article VI as "specious reasoning."" Both in George and
Clark the Supreme Court denied certiorari."
We have so far observed that the provision of the 1917
Draft Act for religious conscientious objectors related religious scruples to the bearing of arms to membership in a historic pacifist church or sect, a provision that was broadly construed by an executive order in implementation of the statute.
The Selective Draft Law Cases of 1918 upheld the constitutionality of the act. The 1940 Draft Law extended the exemption to religious objectors whose scruples were not conditioned
by affiliation with a well-known pacifist church or sect.
Though the two draft acts provided exemption to scruples
based on "religious beliefs" (1917) and on "religious beliefs
and training" (1940), neither statute explicitly and formally
mentioned that the religious belief be in God. It is safe to
surmise that the traditional meaning of religious belief in a
Supreme Being was too obvious to spell out and besides the
courts themselves had explicitly or implicitly so understood
the term "religion." 7 Having disengaged religious scruples
from church-affiliation or confession to any congregational
creed, the conscientious objectors, then proceeded to attack the
constitutionality of the exemption provision for restricting it
to scruples which were prompted by religious, that is, theistic
belief. When the United States Supreme Court refused to
resolve the antinomy between the construction of religion by
74. Id. at 23-24.
75. Cf. supra notes 69 and 73.
76. Cf. Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 343 (1890): "the term religion had
reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to obligations
they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to
his will." See too, Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S.
457, 470-471 (1892), Macintosh v. United States, 283 U.S. 605, 627 (1931)
dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Hughes: "The essence of religion is
belief in a relation to God involving duties superior to those rising from
and human relation". "Allegiance to God is superior to allegiance to civil
power, passin . . . passin. Holmes, Brandeis, Stone concur in the Chief
Justice's dissent.
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the Second and Ninth Circuit courts, Congress, in 1948, formally and explicitly adopted the traditional meaning of religion as a relation to theistic doctrine and refused to include
within the exemption provision conscientious scruples against
arms not based on a belief in God as is abundantly clear from
the congressional committee Hearings on the matter.
Whereas the first two challenges were directed against the
preferential status conferred by the 1917 and 1940 draft laws
upon theistic believers and church affiliation, the third assault
was ingeniously construed-once the disengagement from
church-affiliation had paved the way-under the protective
coverage of "religious beliefs" and by entering within the
meaning of religion. To this ultimate successful challenge,
in Seeger (1965), propositions originally set forth as dicta in
Everson and Torcaso were to contribute the ideas of "nonpreference, "impartiality" and "equivalence" for the latitudinarian mutation of the lexicographical meaning of "religion. "I
With the dislodgment of the church-membership requirement and the reaffirmation of theism as the core meaning of
"religious beliefs" in the statute of 1948, the only course left
against congressional intransigence on religious, that is, theistically, motivated scruples against the bearing of arms, was
to induce the Supreme Court to subsume non-theistic conscientious protests under the same literary connotation of "religion" as the theistically rooted scruple. The Court could be
induced to this purpose by facing it with a dilemma for which
the Court itself had paved the way in the last twenty years.
The restriction of exemption to pacifist theists was a frankly
preferential benevolence denied to non-theist pacifists. But
prior to 1947, inspite of the almost general proscription of
state financial aid to religious institutions, not only the federal
government but even state governments under one form or
another, by one justifying rationale or another, provided
fiscal benefits to religious institutions and agencies in a large
variety of ways. Why is 1947 the origination of that course
of dialectical gymnastics that conduced with reasonable expectation the outcome of Seeger in 1965 ?
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The First Amendment to the Constitution, of itself, binds
only the Federal government. "Congress," says the Amendment, "shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." The States
were left free by the Amendment to regulate the regulation
between government and religion as they chose. But most of
the areas in which religion comes into contact with government
lie within the jurisdiction of the States rather than of the
Federal government. Such are marriage and the family,
public morals, the protection of life and health, some parts of
criminal and civil law and, supremely, education. In 1925,
however, the Supreme Court began to interpret the Fourteenth
Amendment as meaning that the First Amendment was binding on the States as well as on the Federal government.- It was
not until 1947 that the Court for the first time undertook to
apply the establishment of religion clause of the First Amendment to the States and their administrative subdivisions, such
as counties, municipalities and school districts. Prior to 1947,
the Court had decided only three cases under the establishment clause. All three had involved the Federal government,
and in each of these cases the Court upheld the government
against the charge that it acted in such a way as to establish
religion.
The clause in the First Amendment that "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion" was first
invoked in Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), where
the Supreme Court sustained a federal appropriation for the
construction of a public ward to be administered as part of a
hospital under the control of Sisters of the Roman Catholic
Church. The Court found no prohibited aid to religion but
rather a valid appropriation in aid of a group of privately
incorporated individuals whose religious affiliations and beliefs were beyond the scope of judicial inquiry. Federal appropriations were again challenged in Quick Bear v. Leupp,
210 U.S. 50 (1908), where the Supreme Court distinguished
between federal funds held in trust for the beneficial use of
Indian wards, at whose request such funds could be used to
reimburse the religious schools which they attended, and funds
from the public treasury which could not be paid to any sectarian group for educational purposes. The Court, though
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holding that such use of trust funds in no way violated the
First Amendment (citing Bradfield v. Roberts, supra), declined to comment on the extent to which the Amendment
might forbid a similar expenditure from public funds. In
Selective Draft Law cases, 245 U.S. 366 (1918), the Supreme
Court upheld the Selective Service Act of 1917 over the objection, inter alia, that the clause, exempting ministers and members of religious sects whose tenets deny the moral right to
engage in war, constituted an establishment of religion. D.6th
('59)
In 1947 the Court upheld the constitutionality of a New
Jersey statute which provided at public expense bus transportation to all school children whether they attended governmental schools or nongovernmental schools, as a legitimate
exercise of state police power." Not content with satisfying
the requirements of law, the Court, in acknowledgment of the
appellant's contention, also considered whether public aid to
religion was constructively a violation of the First Amendment. It pronounced:
The establishment of religion clause of the First
Amendment means at least this: Neither a state nor
the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another.... No tax in any
amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may
be called, or whatever form they may adopt to teach
or practice religion. 8
What apparently at its face seemed to many jurists at most
a dictum as far as the precise issue before the Court was in
time officially adopted as a constitutional law proposition,7"
and in its light the meaning of the establishment clause has
changed considerably from what had been understood by such
leading authorities of constitutional law as Storey, Cooley and
77. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
78. Id. at 15. For a personal study of the issues involved, particularly as
related to education under religious auspices or religious practices in
public schools confer, Costanzo, THIS NATION UNDER GOD, CHURCH, STATE
AND SCHOOLS IN AMERICA (Herder and Herder 1964).
79. Cf. McCollum v. Board of Education, 33 U.S. 203 (1948) where the dictum
is repeated, and Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) where it is
affirmed as a proposition of constitutional construction.
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Corwin.8 0 What matters for our discourse is that the Court
was putting forth a proposition that has been variously described as one of absolute separation of church and state, of
governmental neutrality, of governmental impartiality between believers, and between believers and non-believers.
Apart from its implications on governmental fiscal aids to
religious institutions, it set down a proposition which advocates of the "rights" of non-believers, whether for themselves
or in denial of governmental action toward others, could use
as a premise for the evolution of the notion that the non-believer should have equal status with the believer within the protective coverage of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. Encouraged then by the Everson dictum and undeterred
by the reaffirmation of the traditional meaning of religion
by the Draft Act of 1948, they succeeded in inducing the Court
to make such an admission 14 years later in Torcaso v. Watkins (1961) again by a dictum, though not as prominently
incorporated within the text of the opinion as in Everson, at
least appended as a footnote.
In Torcaso1 the right of a citizen to become a notary public without being required by law to make a public declaration
of belief in God was upheld. It would have been more felicitous had the court not subsumed in a footnote,8" by an exercise
The study on the historical-legal meaning of the no-establishment clause is
one of the most agitated and prolific in the last two decades in publications
on constitutional law and outside the scope of our paper.
81. Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
82. "Among religions in this country which do not teach a belief in the existence
of God are Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and
others." Id. at 495 n. 11. Two reflections on this proposition may provide
pause on the soundness of the statement as a correct proposition theologically speaking and secondly suggest serious doubts as to its viability as a
constitutional principle. First, though the oriental beliefs differ in their
concept of theism from the western creeds--the personality of the divine
being, its trinitarian nature, its eternal immutability, its transcendence as
well as its immanence, the order of creation, the eternal distinctiveness of
the personal immortality of humanism the afterlife-still the far eastern
oriental faiths-whatever the concept of absorption of human realities into
the absolute, or the belief on reincarnation, or the eternal procession of
absolute being in time and space in manifold phenomenal manifestations,
or the unreality of temporal-spatial realities-none of these faiths denied
the objectivity the Absolute, of the Permanent Reality and its distinctiveness from the subjectivity of worshippers or non-worshippers-and would
scarcely merit being linked with atheism or the nontheism of Ethical Culture
and Secular Humanism, Eastern religious confess to, not deny, a Supreme
Being.
Secondly, if the Court intended neutrality between believers and nonbelievers, between theists and non-theistic believers, as it purported to do
in the opinion to which the footnote is appended, then it has placed itself
in a truly uncomfortable posture if such a neutrality were to be applied

80.
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of logical positivism, nontheistic beliefs into the meaning of
religion in the First Amendment. To have preserved even in
legal interpretation the traditional meaning of religion as the
relation of man to a transcendental being, God, would not have
precluded the right of a non-theistic (non-religious) conscience from the protective mantle of the First Amendment
religious clauses. Torcaso could have adequately rested its
ruling on the Anglo-American tradition of law that the right
of belief is a right to an internal area of absolute inviolability
into which inner sanctum neither the law may inquire nor the
coercive power of government force its disclosures. 8 The prolongation of the propositions of Everson-originally a dictum
-become apparent in the passage in Torcaso to which the
footnote-dictum is appended.
Neither (a State nor the Federal government) can
constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements
which aid all religions as against non-believers, and
neither can aid those religions based on a belief in the
existence of God as against those religions founded
on different beliefs.8"
to the area of education, that area on which these presuppositions may not
be taught-in public schools to underly those-the inculcation of moral and
civic values which the state expects the public school children to learnthen in effect the Court is underwriting the teaching of Ethical Culture
and Secular Humanism in these tax-supported schools and conferring upon
these non-theistic "beliefs" a preferred status in contravention of the noestablishment clause of the First Amendment. It would seem at this time
that the Court in order to avoid conferring a preferential status upon
Secular Humanism in its consideration of the question of tax aid to churchaffiliated institutions of learning, infra-collegiate and collegiate, may have
to fix upon the secular achievements in these religious schools without
prejudice to its religious affiliation and its religious teachings. Only in
this way can neutrality and impartiality be hyphenated to comport with
both religious clauses of the First Amendment.
83. Cf. Costanzo. Wholesome Neutrality: Law and Education, 43 N.D. LAw
REv. 605, 633-84 (1967).
84. Cf. supra, note 81 at 495.
On writs of Certirori to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit. United States v. Jakobson, 325 F.2d 409 (2d Cir. 1963), United
tSates v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964). In Jakobson, the Second
Circuit espoused the view that the Supreme Being clause must be liberally
interpreted to prevent constitutional difficulties which might arise from
protecting the "free exercise" of only a few favored religious. Id. at 415.
Jakobson, while recognizing an Ultimate Cause or Creator of all existence,
contended there were two basic views of man's relationship to his Creator:
the conventional "vertical" image which conceived of God as being on a
higher plane than man, and the "horizontal" view which pictured the
Creator as man's partner, allowing mortals to share in the grandeur and
joy of the universe. He maintained that only the horizontal persepctive led
to the love for one's brethren which made war abhorrent and unallowable.
Id. at 413. Inable to believe that Congress meant to exclude views of this
character, or to require draft boards to distinguish between "vertical and
horizontal transcendence", the court concluded that the statute must be
broad enough to embrace Jakobson's views. Id. at 416. By refusing to
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Just as it was the antinomy to legal interpretation between the broad construction of "religion" in the Draft Law
of 1940 by the Second Circuit court opinions in Kauten v.
United States (1943) and United States ex rel. Phillips v.
Downer (1943) and the traditional meaning of religion by the
Ninth Circuit court opinion in Berman v. United States (1946)
that forced Congress to specifically include the Supreme Being
requirement in its definition of religious belief in the Selecperpetuate unduly restrictive concepts of a Supreme Being, the Second Circuit in Jakobson set the stage for Seeger, which squarely posed the issue
of whether the requirement of belief in a Supreme Being could validly be
employed at all. To arrive at its conclusion, the Seeger court, assuming
arguendo that Congress could constitutionally withdraw the conscientious
objector provision (of Macintosh and Hamilton cases), reasoned that the
conditions which it could place upon exercise of the privilege were subject
to constitutional limitations. Having established the proposition that Congress could not unconstitutionally condition a privilege which it could constitutionally withdraw, the court proceeded to find the Supreme Being
requirement an unconstitutional limitation. 326 F.2d at 854. For support
the court relied on Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), which held that
while a state legislature was not required to give a property tax rebates
to veterans, it could not condition such a grant on a procedure which
amounted to less than due process, i.e., the signing of loyolatu oaths. The
application of the Speiser principle to Seeger necessitated an extension of
the former, since in Speiser an error on the part of the state could have
resulted in denial of a constitutional right, whereas a similar mistake in
the Seeger situation could not abridge the nonexistent right to a draft
exemption. Neither the deistic nor the nondeistic conscientious objector is
entitled under the Constitution to a draft exemption. (cf. Macintosh and
Hamilton and to federal circuit court of appeals which relied on the Macintosh and Hamilton rationale on congressional grace).
'However, the extension was not unwarranted, given the traditional definition of religion of section 456 (j) of the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948.' "While the problem of discrimination falls historically
within the proscription of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is settled that
most, if not all, aspects of equal protection are embodied in the due process
requirement of the Fifth Amendment. Therefore, in the words of the Seeger
circuit court, "a line such as is drawn by the 'Supreme Being' requirement
between different forms of religious expression cannot be permitted to stand
consistently with the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment." 326 F.2d
at 854. Whether or not the line drawn by the statute is violative of the
Fifth Amendment depends on its reasonableness, in the light of the purpose
sought to be attained. Arguably, down to the Supreme Court ruling in
Seeger (1965), the Supreme Being requirement was a reasonable implementation of a valid legislative purpose because confession to Supreme
Being, to theistic transcendence, provided an objective norm, however
dubious, that pragmatically at least served as an external shield of defense
against arbitrary objections, whether sincerely or insincerely professed,
based on allegedly political, sociological, and other nonreligious grounds.
Even Mr. Justice Augustus Hand had distinguished his broad concept of
religion in Kauten from political objections. If however, as it not appears
in the light of the Seeger ruling of 1965, the subjective test of sincerity
proceeding from an avowal of broadly religious conscientious scruples can
be as reliable or suspect as the formerly objective tests of membership in a
historic pacifist church or profession of religious pacifism, the way has
undoubtedly been paved that cannot be marked off by a line, the distinction
between religious scruples however God, now understood from purely moral
conscientious scruples which openly affirms atheism or formally denies God
even in the broad understanding of Seeger. What undoubtedly encouraged
the Second Circuit court to its Seeger rationale were the neutrality and
impartiality affirmations in Everson and, more pertinently in Torcaso, in
order to avoid the charge of favoritisms among religions, however religion
and theism is now legally to be understood.
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tive Service Act of 1948-in default of judicial review by the
United States Supreme Court, so too, it is the antinomy between the opinions of the Second Circuit court-a route understandably favored by the litigants and their lawyers-and
the Ninth Circuit court, that would confront the Supreme
Court to decide whether the Supreme Being requirement may
adumbrate under its dictionary meaning non-theistic believers,
as Torcaso seemed to augur, or whether it may abide by the
traditional meaning of Supreme Being, as the Ninth Circuit
court had consistently adhered to. The contest between the
Kauten" (all moral conscientious objectors) and the Berman"
line (theistic religious scruples) was to be resolved not by opposing one against the other with the weight of congressional
specification on the Berman side, but by gaining entrance into
a more expansive (even if uncomfortable) meaning of theism
and religion by relating (or equating) Supremacy of Being to
Supremacy of conscientious reference.
In collating the trilogy of Seeger, Jakobson, and Peter"
for final review the United States Supreme Court was faced
with an impasse from which it was able to extricate itself only
by rising above the constitutional challenges. For such an effor the Court has had a persevering tradition of guidelines
to exert every ingenuity to safeguard the constitutionality of
a legislation short of a judicial denial of a clear constitutional
right.8 Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion is remarkable
for its frankness on this point.
The legislative history of this Act leaves much in the
dark. But it is, in my opinion, not a tour de force if
we construe the words "Supreme Being" to include
the cosmos as well as an anthropomorphic entity. If it
is a tour de force so to hold, it is no more so than other
instances where we have gone to extremes to construe
an Act of Congress to save it from demise on constitutional grounds. In a more extreme case than the
present one we said that the words of the statute may
be strained "in the candid service of avoiding a
85. United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 164 (1965) ; United States v. Jakobson,
380 U.S. 164 (1965); Peter v. United States, 380 U.S. 164 (1965) ; Nos. 50,
51, and 29 October Term, 1964. Ruling rendered on March 8, 1965.
86. Cf. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288 (1936) concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis at 346-348.
For a remarkably similar set of rules set down ten years previously cf. the
eminent constitutional jurist, Ed Ward S. Corwin, Judicial Review in Action,
U. of PA. L. R. 639 (1926).
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Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 477
The majority opinion of Court delivered by Mr. Justice
Clark, on the other hand, is more confident about the propriety
of its construction and in fact, proceeds to relate its ingenious
interpretation to congressional intent and even to the implications of the Berman ruling. And as if to render its interpretation theologically respectable, it even quotes knowledgeably from Tillich and other "modern" theologians and the
Ecumenical Council no less.8" Much is made of the disparity
between the explicit use of the appellation "God" in Macintosh and Berman and on the other hand the employment
rather of "Supreme Being" in the Act of Congress of 1948
to reason that Congress intended by this substitution to refrain
from the narrow connotation and to deliberately intend a
broadened meaning by "Supreme Being." And all this is done,
it seems, with the blessing of Chief Justice Hughes whose definition of religion as "a relation to God involving duties superior to those arising from any human relation" had been relied
upon in part by the Berman ruling. But the passage 9 which
the Court quotes from the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice
Hughes in Macintosh can lend support to Seeger only by considering it in itself, severing it from the rest of the succeeding
passages even though Justice Clark reads it as an interpretative commentary upon the later statement with the appellation
"God." Generally a commentary follows upon a passage to be
so interpreted, or if it precedes it-contrary to the usual usage
it would pointedly forewarn that the succeeding passage is
to be understood by the preceding propositions.
87. Cf. supra note 85, Mr. Justice Douglas concurring opinion, at 1. (refers to
85 of this page).
88. Cf. supra note 85 at 14-20.
89. Cf. supra note 85 (of this page) at 12.
(P)utting aside dogmas with their particular conceptions of deity,
freedom of conscience itself implies respect for an innate conviction of
paramount duty. The battle for religious liberty has been fought and
won with respect to religious beliefs and practices, which are not in
conflict with good order, upon the very ground of the supremacy of
conscience within its proper field.
Macintosh v. United States, 283 U.S. 605, 632 (1931). Mr. Justice Clark
might have considered that in "putting aside dogmas with their particular
conceptions of deity" Chief Justice Hughes was not putting aside the deity
but particularity of differing conceptions of the deity and further that the
"supremacy of conception" that Chief Justice Hughes here speaks of is a
"supremacy" that is related to those "duties superior to those arising from
any human relation" because of the relation of these duties to "God" which
is apparently what Chief Justice Hughes meant in the succeeding passage.
Id. at 633-634.
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Be that as it may, the Court had a purpose in radically
redefining the term "religion," for, in this way, it could avoid
the issues raised by the First Amendment cases of School District of Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the ruling
on the Bible and the Lord's Prayer, and Engel v. Vitale, 370
U.S. 421 (1962) on a voluntary school prayer, and more especially, by Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the
Maryland notary public oath case, where, after stating that
"neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion," (at 495) the Court noted that there are religions which
are not predicated upon a conventional belief in God. (at 495
n. 11) In addition to the First Amendment problems which
would arise under the Berman view of the test, a problem
would present itself as to the denial of due process which is
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment. In fact, the court of
appeals in Seeger held that the exemption clause was violative
of the due process guarantee in that it established an impermissible classification."0 As we have already noted, it is a
fundamental rule of the judicial process that a statute should
be construed so as not to draw its constitutionality into question, but in Seeger the Court's intellectual maneuvering was
patently a failure to confront the real, hard issue, that has
only been delayed and only time can bring about another unavoidable confrontation-the question whether the free exercise or establishment clause of the First Amendment or the due
process guarantee of the Fifth Amendment was possibly violated. The Court was careful to note--as it skirted the constitutional issue-that none of the individuals involved were
The
atheists and that it was not deciding that question.'
Court avoided the problem presented by the Berman ruling
90. United States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846, 854 (2d. Cir. 1964).
91. Cf. supra note 85 (I) at 10: "No party claims to be an atheist or attacks
the statute on this ground. The question is not, therefore, one between
theistic and atheistic beliefs. We do not deal with or intimate any decision
on that situation in this case. Nor do the parties claim the montheistic
belief that there is but one God; what they claim (with the possible exception of Seeger who bases his position here not on factual but on purely
constitutional grounds) is that they adhere to theism, as opposed to atheism,
which is "the belief in the existence of a god or gods: belief in the superhuman powers or spiritual agencies in one or many gods." Our question
here, therefore, is the narrow one: Does the term "Supreme Being" as used
in #6(j) mean the orthodox God or the broader concept of a power or being,
or a faith," to which all else is subordinate or upon which all else is ultimate y dependent"?

Published by Law Archive of Wyoming Scholarship, 1970

53

Land & Water Law Review, Vol. 6 [1970], Iss. 2, Art. 10

640

LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW

Vol. VI

by interpreting the Senate Report92 on the 1948 Act in such a
way as to conclude that, "rather than citing Berman for what
it said 'religious belief' was, Congress cited it for what 'religious belief' was not."9 " This sort of interpretation is not
likely to offer the most assuring prospects of ascertaining
legislative intent. Much less persuasive was Mr. Justice
Clark's notice that the Senate Report "was intended to reenact" substantially the same provisions as were found "in
the 1940 Act." 9 4 To have pointed out, as he does, that statute,
of course, refers to "religious training and belief without
more," 5 is not to eliminate effectively the significance of the
Senate's specific citation of Berman (with its appellation
"God") as the Senate's construction of the 1940 Act's "religious training and belief" phrase. The "substantial reenactment" in 1948 of the 1940 provisions could more reasonably mean that the original reference contained that traditional meaning (if not word) of God-man religious belief
which the 1948 points to by its citation of Berman. Perhaps
the expediency of weakening an obvious historical legislative
record prompted the less likely construction.
Under the Seeger test, the only statutorily excluded claims
are those based upon (1) scruples which are essentially political, sociological or philosophical and are accompanied by a
disavowal of religious belief as it is defined by the Court, and
(2) a personal moral code which is the only basis for objection
and has no relation whatsoever to a Supreme Being.
The dubiety of the new test is not centered in the Court's
positing of those who are explicitly excluded from exemption,
but rather in the novel understanding of what constitutes religion. It would now seem that any conscientious objector may
benefit from the exemption from service clause provided he is
evidently sincere in his avowed scruples and does not explicitly
disavow theism-however they may be understood. Besides,
the objector need not disown political, sociological, or philosophical rationales provided these are not the sole basis of his
claim for the classification. One might cynically observe that
92.
93.
94.
95.

S. Rep. No. 1268, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1948).
Cf. upra note 85 (I) at 12-13.
Id.
Id.
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a person clever enough to simulate sincerity and intelligent
enough to formulate his objection to military service in language as to fit with the legal requirements as interpreted by
Seeger would have an advantage over the avowed atheist who
is sincerely convinced of the uselessness or wrongfulness of
modern war. But then too the same cynic ought to allow that
even with the benefit of external norms of sincerity, which
formerly prevailed in 1917 as membership in a historic pacifist church and in 1940 religious scruples without any such affiliation, that even such a claim could be made expediently
without inner profound commitment. These reflections are
made to suggest that the practical effect of the Seeger ruling
is to compound the difficulties with which a Local Draft Board
must cope in deciding whether a protestor is truly eligible for
the exemption."
IN SUA MATION

Now, to purse together what is allowable under statutory
and decisional law. Exemption to the" bearing of arms" based
on religious scruples is dependent upon an act of congressional
grace and not upon a claim of constitutional right. Once the
categories of exemption are established by the supreme legislature, its terms must not be violative of constitutionally guaranteed rights or the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment by a show of discriminatory preference. The direct
challenge to a claim of a preferential status of a definition of
religion in disregard of the no-establishment and free exercise
of religion was avoided by enlarging upon the traditional
meaning of religion to include what is equivalently ultimate
in every man's conscience, provided that such a profession is
not accompanied by an explicit formal affirmation of atheism
or is exclusively identical in its rationale with philosophical,
political, economic or sociological considerations concerning
the justice or utility of war. The line between religious scruples
96. The enlargement of the difficulties are not eased by Mr. Justice Clark's
confidence in the provision of the Act for "a comprehensive scheme for
assisting the Appeals Board in making this determination (of whether a
belief is truly held)-placing at their service the Federal Bureau of Investigation, hearing examiners and other facilities of the Department of
Justice." Cf. supra note 85(I) at 21-22. The rulings of the civilian boards
are not subject to judicial review except as a defense against criminal
prosecution, is a relevant question but one which is not directly pertinent
to our discourse and so need not detain us here.
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which stop short of denying human relations to a "Supreme
Being" and whose belief is sincere and meaningful in the sense
that it "occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God" and accordingly
"qualifies for the exemption" is but for that denial or restraint from denial, scarcely discernible from a philosophical
moral objector who openly avows atheism. Be that as it may, a
conscientious objector whose dissent is honored as sincere and
meaningful by the civilian draft boards may choose to serve in
the armed forces in a noncombat function or serve his country
in civilian work outside the military, contributing to the
maintenance of the national health, safety and interest. Obviously, test for a ministerial exemption differs from that of
a lay conscientious objector. A claim of ministerial exemption
is a factual question susceptible of exact proof by evidence of
membership in a pacifist church or sect." The validity of a
"belief" cannot be questioned.9" Local Boards, and for that
matter the courts, may not pry into the "truth" of a belief or
reject it as being incomprehensible. But it is their responsibility to ascertain where the "belief" is" truly held." In every
case then, as the Court admits, the question that must be resolved is the one of sincerity. The burden of proof is clearly
upon the conscientious objector above all of the Seeger type
and there are more demands made upon such a one than say
upon the dissenter who is a member of a historic pacifist
church or even of one whose religious scruples are premised
upon theism.
Since the ultimate question is sincerity, the registrant
cannot, like the minister-registrant, rely solely on
objective facts, but in his case objective facts are relevant only in so far as they help determine the sincerity of the registrant in his claimed belief. The
registrant has the burden to show clearly that he is
entitled to classification as a conscientious objector,
and the burden is not shifted by his statement as to
his belief. In a word, he must establish credibility of
97. What constitutes a church or who is an "ordained" minister is a relevant
question. Cf. Legal Aspects of Selective Service. Revised January 1, 1963.
pp. 19-24. Ministerial Classification in General.
98. "Some theologians, and indeed some examiners might be tempted to question
the existence of the registrant's "Supreme Being" or the truth of his concepts. But these are inquiries foreclosed to Government." Cf. supra note

85(I) p. 21.

https://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/10

56

Costanzo: Conscription and the Conscientious Objectors

1971

CONSCRIPTION AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS OBJECTORS

643

his claim of conscience apart from testimonies by
witnesses or his own statements as to his beliefs. In
this writer's judgment, if this was a difficulty with
religious scruples related to theistic premises but with
no relation to a pacifist church or sect, the difficulty
of proof would seem to be even greater for the dissenter who relates his conscience to a "Supreme
Being" without committing himself to belief in a
personal God.
The rulings of the civilian boards are not subject to judicial
review except as a defense against criminal prosecution. Their
determinations are final and may not be reversed by the
courts.9"
Recourse to the courts by defendants is generally predicated on a claim-as in the past-of the unconstitutionality
of the statutory exemption or-as in our times-the unconstitutionality of our combative involvement in Vietnam. On
the latter question the Supreme Court has at least in two cases
refused to grant certiorari0 0 by civilian complainants and by
99. "The provision making the decisions of the local boards 'final' means to us
that Congress chose not to give administrative action under this Act the
customary scope of judicial review which obtains under other statutes. It
means that the courts are not to weigh the evidence to determine whether
the classification made by the local boards was justified. The decisions of
the local boards are made in conformity with the regulations are final even
though they may be erroneous. The question of jurisdiction of the local
board is reached only if there is no basis in fact for the classification which
it gave the registrant." Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114 (1946) quoted
in Seeger at 21-22.
100. Cf. United States v. Johnson, United States Court of Military Appeals,
September 26, 1967, per curiam, 18 N.S.C.M.A. 246. Case No. 401 on the
appellate docket for the 1967 term of the United States Supreme Court.
Mora v. McNamara. Lower Federal Courts have traditionally waived this
challenge aside since the conduct of war, whether by congressional declaration of war or by presidential powers is considered as purely a political
and military act and therefore outside the judicial determination. Strictly
speaking, the Supreme Court can legally review the acts of the Commander
in Chief. Technically, its power of judicial review extends to all Federal
constitutional questions. Its refusal to grant certororari stems from a
longstanding judicial reluctance to challenge the President in wartime over
the legality of his wartime actions. Historically, the Supreme Court has
a record reaching as far back as the Civil War, of permitting highly
questionable acts by the Executive during wartime. Occasionally, it has
declared those or similar acts, illegal-but only after the war has ended.
Not until after the Civil War was over, did the Court declare that President
Lincoln had overstepped his authority in suspending habeas corpus by
trying civilians in military courts. It similarly waited until peace came
before declaring unconstitutional the martial law imposed on Hawaii during
World War II (and the confinement of American born Japanese citizens in
segregated camps during the war on the west coast). The sole notable exception (to judicial refrain without effective consequence) occurred at the
very beginning of the Civil War, after the right of habeas corpus had been
suspended in Maryland under authority granted by President Lincoln to
his generals. Chief Justice Taney, act in camera for the Supreme Court
in Ex parte Merryman granted a writ of habeas corpus to a lieutenant of
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complainants in military service. It is well to stress that any
deferment, whether for occupational reasons or for religious
scruples, are given only when they serve the national interest.
This is patently obvious in regard to the former. The exemption that covers conscientious objectors is intended to fulfill
a double purpose,-the claim of conscience and a civilian
service "in the National health, safety, of interest."
S1UMMATION AND ADDENDA

Successive steps at which a justiciable action may arise
for conduct in violation of the requirements of the Military
Service Act of 1967 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice
Act of 1968 may be set down as follows:
a) those eligible refuse to submit to registration with their
local draft board.
b) registrant refuses to report for induction.
c) registrant reports for induction but refuses to be
sworn in.
d) serviceman in noncombat military camp refuses to
perform normal military assignments that are unrelated to
combatant engagement.
e) serviceman in noncombat military post refuses to
fulfill an assignment that is related to combat services of
others, e.g., train pilots.
f) serviceman refuses to go to combat area.
g) serviceman deserts upon receipt of orders assigning
him to combat area.
a secessionist drill company who had been imprisoned by the military in
Fort McHenry. When General Cadwallader, commanding the fort, refused
to release Merryman, the Chief Justice issued a writ of attachment for
contempt against the general. When the Federal Marshall attempting to
serve the writ was refused to admittance to the fort, Taney had to content
himself with filing his option. In it he argued that only Congress could
suspend the right of habeas corpus, that even it could not do so if the civil
courts in the area were open, and that the suspension had therefore been
an act of military usurpation. It may well be that since the conduct of a
war is an exercise of war that as much, once it is initiated, it cannot be as
easily constrained by the rule of law and is therefore not deemed justiciable
-susceptible to resolution in the courts. This note is, however, not revelatory of whether this writer does in fact personally question the legal basis
for the American involvement in Vietnam, but is descriptive of Supreme
Court conduct.
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h) serviceman in combat area refuses to perform combat
duties.
i) serviceman in combat area deserts in order not to participate in combat operations.
j) serviceman in combat area refuses to carry out a specific combat assignment.
We will limit our concluding considerations to those litigations upon which the United States Supreme Court has
ruled as a valid claim of conscience and discourse in part about
the regulations on protest and dissent activities of servicemen
as these activities may be subsumed under the freedom of
expression rights of the first amendment. Apart from the
Captain Levy case, consideration of the legitimate invocation
of the Nuremburg doctrine on Crimes Against Humanity,
Crimes Against Peace, War Crimes, and Conspiracy to commit any of the foregoing crimes, cannot possibly be contained
within narrow bounds and deserves for the complexities of the
issues involved and the controversies about them a comprehensive and independent study.
Absolute (universal)

Conscientious Objectors

Our historical survey of the origins of conscription have
been related to the American constitutional history of the conscientious objector to military service and combat. The constitutional premise is still in the construction of the Court an
exercise of congressional grace; its statutory provisions until
the Seeger ruling, membership in a historic pacifist church or
sect. The Seeger ruling expanded from within the meaning
of "religion" to include nontheistic ultimate referrals that in
effect stop short of openly avowed atheism. We have noted
elsewhere that the high tribunal could have avoided this judicial interpolation in lexicography which has its original
inspiration in footnote 10 of Torcaso.
It would have been more felicitous had the Court not
subsumed in a footnote, nontheistic beliefs into the
meaning of religion in the First Amendment. The
Court could have adequately rested its ruling on the
Anglo-American tradition of law that the right to
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belief is a right to an internal domain of absolute inviolability, into which inner sanctum neither the law
nor the coercive power of government force its disclosure."0 '
The national judiciary had steadfastly with but one exception held to the meaning of religion as an orthodox belief
in God in accord with the highest tribunals understanding of
the term in Davis v. Beason (1889), Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States (1892), United States v. Macintosh (1930),
Hamilton v. Regents of California(1934). The one exception
occurred in a lower federal court dictum of Justice Agustus
Hand who in United States v. Kauten (1943) undertook to
redefine "religion" in the Selective Service Act of 1940 in a
manner that strongly suggests the latitudinarian construction of Seeger even though the Supreme Court makes no such
acknowledgment of indebtedness. This dictum, which we may
note was not actually necessary for the disposition of the
litigation in Kauten was, however, adopted by the same Second
Circuit Court of Appeals that same year in United States ex
rel. Phillips v. Downer. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
in contrast, clung to the traditional and prevailing meaning
of religion in its Berman ruling.
The Supreme Court's abiding intention to preserve whenever possible the constitutionality of congressional law would
have served in the long run a more positive purpose in constitutional interpretation had this paramount intent been subordinated to the necessity and advantages of preserving the
identity of meanings of words even at the hazard of striking
down the constitutionality of 6(j) of the Universal Military
101. The question of the legality of selective conscientious objector to
a particular war is before the United States Supreme Court now
in the case of John H. Sisson, Jr., whose conviction for refusing
induction was overturned in April, 1969, by Chief Judge Charles E. Wyzanski of the United States District Court for Massachusetts. U.S. v. Sisson,
297 F. Supp. 902, 1969 found the 1967 Selective Service Act unconstitutional
on the ground that it discriminates against non-theists, religious or not,
with profound moral convictions.
The sincerely conscientious man, whose principles flow from reflection,
education, practice, sensitivity to competing claims, and a search for a
meaningful life, always brings impressive credentials. When he honestly
believes that he will act wrongly if he kills, his claim obviously has
great magnitude. That magnitude is not appreciably lessened if his
belief relates not to war in general, but to a particular war or to a
particualr type of war. Indeed a sensitive conscientious objector might
reflect a more discriminating conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding.
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Training and Service Act by submitting it to the tests of the
twin religious clauses of the First Amendment, the nondiscriminatory requirements of the equal protection of laws, and
the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. In such an
eventuality, the problem would have been referred back to the
Congress on how to relate the moral prerogative of immunity
of conscience to a legal status without endangering on the one
hand national security and on the other, without exposing a
legal favor to abuse. For not every claim of conscience is a
conscientious claim. Mr. Justice Clark's latitudinarian interpolation of "Supreme Being" expression in the Universal
Military Training and Service Act is made to rest on a supposed motivation when the Congress did not use the designation "God, "-despite the explicit reference to Berman in the
Senate Report on the 1948 Act. This was an ingenious exercise of professing to understand and follow the authentic legislative intent contrary, we respectfully submit, to its patent
purpose.
The Seeger ruling, despite its explicit intent to hold the
line against "essentially political, sociological, or philosophical views" and from "merely personal moral code", in fact
weakens the distinction by which the cut-off of exemption from
military duty may be maintained. First, the restraint from
an open avowal of atheism is too tenuous to have any great
practical significance. Atheists and secular humanists need
not find it conscientiously intolerable to phrase their conscientious objection to war as did the defendants in Seeger. Secondly, a "merely personal moral code," sincerely avowed, is
scarcely distinguishable from Seeger's "belief in and devotion
to goodness and virtue for their own sakes, and a religious faith
in a purely ethical creed." (Jakobson held to the "belief in a
Supreme Reality" and Peter in the existence of a universal
power beyond that of man.) Thirdly, why should a moral
philosophical conviction on the immorality of war be distinguishable from a sincere and meaningful belief whose saving
grace seems to be that it does not formally avow atheism, as
Seeger chose not to commit himself one way or the other.
Fourthly, does not a moral imperative presuppose a conscientious evaluatory judgment of human realities-not excluding
the political, sociological, and economic ? Men do not act on
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principle but on motivations (practical judgments) in the light
of a principle. There are general principles of morality but
not general morality. Morality inheres in each particular
concrete human act. It seems to this writer that once the conscientious objection is disengaged from its theistic referral,
both practically and rationally, for better or for worse the line
cannot be logical held.
In Oesterreich v. Selective Service System Local Board,
393 U.S. 233 (1938), the Court ruled that the grant of draftexempt status to a divinity student was not revocable under
the delinquency regulations and unconditioned by activities
that are unrelated to the original grant of exemption. "When
Congress has granted an exemption and a registrant meets
its terms and conditions, a Board (cannot) . . .withhold it

from him for activities or conduct not material to the grant
or withdrawal of the exemption." The draft board had declared Oesterreich delinquent because he protested United
States participation in the Vietnam war by returning his draft
card to the Government. The delinquency procedure, the
Court ruled, was "without statutory basis and in conflict
with" Oesterreich's explicit statutory right to an exemption.
Selective Conscientious Objector
One would suppose that if the "religious" conscience of
the absolute pacifist can lay claim to draft-exemption, the
claim of conscience based on a discriminating evaluatory
judgment on the justice or injustice of a particular war would
commend itself with greater reasonableness to the legislature.
It is safe to say that the generality of mankind does distinguish
between just and unjust wars and whatever the merits of the
sincere subjective conscience of the absolute pacifist, a free
and independent political community would not long survive
against an aggressor without the ultimate recourse to arms.
But the absolute pacifist has the legal advantage of not subjecting his religious scruples and the validity of his beliefs to
inquiry by the government whereas the selective objector,
precisely because his moral evaluatory judgment is related
to a factual situation, would have to demonstrate the correctness of his moral stance. Besides, this pragmatic difficulty
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is doubly compounded by the danger of converting draft boards
into Inquisitions-unless both statutory and decisional law
would hold the SCO equally with the ACO to the test of sincerity and not to the demonstrative force of the evaluatory
judgment as SCO are in some continental countries, where
draft exempt provision is extended to them.
Selective Conscientious Objector-Classified
but not yet inducted
Draftees who have registered and been classified by the
local draft board have expressed their selective protest against
the American involvement in the Vietnam war by burning
their draft card or turning it in to the draft board.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the defendant publicly burned his Selective Service Registration
certificate in order to influence others to adopt his antiwar
protest. The defendant was convicted under the provisions of
the 1965 Amendment to the Universal Military Training and
Service Act of 1948, (Section 462(b) (3) of Title 50 App. of
the United States Code), whereby Congress subjected to
criminal liability not only one who "forges, alters, or in any
manner changes" but also one who "knowingly destroys, (or)
knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such certificate". Chief Justice Warren, in the opinion of the Court,
upheld the constitutionality of the 1965 Amendment. To the
defendant's claim that his act was 'symbolic speech' under the
protective coverage of the First Amendment, the Chief Justice
responded:
We cannot accept the view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labelled 'speech' whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an idea. However even on the assumption that the alleged communicative element in
O'Brien's conduct is sufficient to bring into play the
First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow that
the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally protected activity. This Court has held
that when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are
combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently
important governmental interest in regulating the
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nonspeech element can justify the incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize
the quality of the government interest which must
appear, the Court has employed a variety of descriptive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating;
paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the government; if it
furthers an important or substantial government intnrest; if the governmental restriction is unrelated to
the suppression of free speech; and if the incidental
restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. We find that the 195 Amendment to #462 (b)
(3) of the Universal Military Training and Service
Act meets all these requirements.
Distinguishing the present ruling from that in Stromberg v.
California,283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court stressed that "both
the governmental interest and the operation of the 1965
Amendment are limited to the noncommunitative aspect of
the defendant's conduct and that the governmental interest
and scope of the 1965 Amendment are limited to preventing
a harm to the smooth and efficient functioning of the Selective
Service Act.
In response to a memorandum circulated to the local
draft boards by the then Selective Service Director Lieut.
General Lewis B. Hershey, counselling the draft boards to
apply the delinquency regulation of the Selective Service Act
against draftees who engaged in "illegal" forms of protestv.g. sit-ins in local draft board offices, turning in registrant's
certificates,-the Supreme Court ruled on the validity of these
delinquency regulations under which, in one case, the defendant's induction was accelerated and in the other, the defendant incurred loss of deferment.
In Gutknecht v. United States decided January 19, 1970,
the Court stated through Mr. Justice William Douglas that:
There is nothing to indicate that Congres authorized
the Selective Service System to reclassify exempt and
deferred registrants for punitive purposes and to
provide for accelerated induction of delinquents. ...
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If federal and state laws are violated by registrants
they can be prosecuted. If induction is to be substituted for these precautions, a vast rewriting of the
draft act is needed.
David Earl Gutknecht had been classified 1-A and was appealing his draft board's refusal to classify him as a conscientious
objector. During a protest demonstration he threw his draft
credentials at the feet of a United States marshal at the Federal Building in Minneapolis. He was declared delinquent and
was ordered to report for induction in five days. When he
refused to be inducted he was convicted of refusing to perform a duty required of him by the Selective Service laws and
was sentenced to four years imprisonment. In overturning
his conviction, the Court stressed that Congress had not set
down statutory standards for the acceleration of induction and
that the asserted discretion of draft boards to do so constitute
a "broad, roving authority, a type of administrative absolutism not congenial to our lawmaking traditions."
In response to complaints in Congress that the Federal
courts were interfering with the Selective Service System's
efforts to discourage illegal activities which physically obstructed recruitment, sit-ins at local draft boards, draft card
burning, turning in registrant's certificate,-by reclassifying
the protestors, Congress passed a law in 1967 which permitted
draft registrants to challenge their reclassifications in court in
one of two ways. One was to submit to induction and then obtain release through habeas corpus proceedings. The other
was to refuse to serve and then raise the objection to the reclassification as a defense to the Government's criminal prosecution. On January 26, 1970, the Court ruled in Breen v.
United States that this provision does not apply in the revocation of a student deferment. In Oesterreich, the preceding
year, the Court had declared that Congress could not have intended to bar those with draft exemptions specifically granted
by Congress-such as men studying for the ministry-from
going to court promptly in a civil suit to challenge a draft
board's attempt to take the exemption away. In Breen the
Court said it was "unable to distinguish" any legal difference
between an exemption and deferment. Until 1967, exemptions
were different from deferments in that they were absolute
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declarations by Congress that men in certain categories
could not be drafted. Student deferments were subject to the
discretion of individual draft boards. But when Congress
amended the law in 1967 it also wrote into the statute specific
standards for student deferments making them similar to
statutory exemptions. The Court reasoned in Breen that Congress could not have intended at the same time to give local
draft boards broad power to cancel these student deferments
free of judicial interference. The defendant, Timothy J.
Breen, an undergraduate at the Berkeley School of Music in
Boston lost his 2-S deferment and was reclassified 1-A after
he gave his draft card to a clergyman as an act of protest. On
the second issue, the Court ruled that the Selective Service
System lacks legal authority to declare students delinquent
and to reclassify them 1-A as punishment for turning in their
draft credentials. On this point, the Breen ruling is but a
prolongation of the ruling in Gutknecht which denied statutory basis for accelerating induction.
Protest, Dissent, and Conscientious Objectors
in Military Service
Protest and Dissent by Military Personnel
On May 28, 1969, the Department of the Army set forth
through the Office of the Adjutant General, Guidance on
Dissent. Acknowledging that the right to express opinions on
matters of public and personal concern is "secured to soldier
and civilian alike by the Constitution and the laws of the
United States," it noted that the exercise of these rights is
not absolute but subject to constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions relevant to the status of the subjects.
The constitutional coverage is in the First Amendment
guarantee of freedom of speech, press, assembly, and right of
petition. Restrictive statutory provisions applicable to all persons, military and civilian relate to activities subversive of
military service and the performance of military duties: (1)
Enticing desertion, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 1381; (2) Counselling insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal to carry out
duties, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2387; (3) Causing or attempting to
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cause insubordination, 18 U.S.C. Sec. 2388; (4) Counselling
evasion of the draft, 50 U.S.C. App. Sec. 462. Stautory restrictions which are specifically applicable to members of the
Army are: (1) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 917 (Article 117, UCMJ)Provoking speech or gestures; (2) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 882 (Article
82, UCMJ) -Soliciting desertion, mutiny, sedition or misbehavior before the enemy; (3) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 904 (Article 104,
UCMJ) -Communication

or corresponding with the enemy;

(4) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 901 (Article 101, UCMJ) -Betraying a
countersign; (5) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 888( article 88, UCMJ)Contemptuous words by commissioned officers against certain officials; (6) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 889 (Article 89, UCMJ)Disrespect toward his superior commissioned officer; (7) 10
U.S.C. Sec. 891 (Article 91, UCMJ) -Disrespect toward a
warrant officer or noncommissioned officer in the execution
of his office; (8) 10 U.S.C. Sec. 892 (Article 92, UCMJ)Failure to obey a lawful order or regulation; (9) 10 U.S.C.
Sec. 934 (Article 134, UCMJ)-Uttering disloyal statements.
In addition to constitutional and statutory provisions,
there are Army regulations that may relate to "soldier dissent". These are (1) AR 210-10, par. 5-5 Dissemination of
publications; (2) AR 360-5, par. 9b Submission for review of
unofficial writings or speeches; (3) AR 380-5 Divulgence of
National Security Information; (4) AR 600-20 Political
Activities (par. 42) and participation in demonstrations (par.
46) ; (5) AR 600-20, par. 31 Appearance and conduct; (6) AR
604-10 Discharge of personnel who are active members of
subversive organizations; (7) AR 670-5 Wearing of unauthorized items on the uniform.
Within the context, then, of the coifstitutional, statutory,
and specifically Army regulatory provisions, Guidance delineates the following norms of conduct:
Concerning the possession and distribution of political
materials, a commander may delay distribution of a specific
issue of a publication which reaches servicemen through official facilities (Post Exchanges and Post Libraries) only if
he determines that the specific publication presents a clear
danger to loyalty, discilpine, or morale of the troops and concurrently with the delay submits a report to the Department
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of the Army. A commander may require prior approval be
obtained for the distribution on the post of publications which
reach servicemen through other than official transits. Denial
of permission for distribution must be related to illegal content
(counselling disloyalty, mutiny, etc.,) or to the manner of its
circulation which impedes training or troop formation. Mere
possession of a publication may not be prohibited unless in
direct violation of post regulations governing unauthorization
and distribution.
Attendance by members of the Army at Coffee Houses
should not be barred because of the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of association and expression. If, however, it
can be demonstrated that activities therein include illegal acts
calculated to have an adverse effect on soldier health, morale
or welfare, e.g., counselling soldiers to refuse to perform duty
or to desert,---commanders may declare such places "offlimits."
Mere membership in "Servicemen's Union" could not
constitutionally be prohibited. But commanders are not authorized to acknowledge or to bargain with them. Specific
acts by individual members of a "servicemen's union", which
constitute offences under UCMJ or AR, e.g., refusal to obey
orders,-may be dealt with appropriately.
"Underground Newspapers" may not be published on
post, with Army facilities, and during duty hours. On the
other hand, such publications off post during off duty hours
and with private resources comes under the protective coverage
of the free press and. speech clauses of the First Amendment,
subject only to such restrictions of federal law which make
certain utterances punishable (e.g., 10 U.S.C. Sec. 2387 or the
UCMJ). On post distribution requires the prior approval of
the commander according to AR 210-10.
On post demonstrations by soldiers is presently prohibited
by AR 600-20 and 600-21. These same regulations prohibit
members of the Army to participate in off-post demonstrations if they are in uniform or during duty time, or in a foreign country,-if the activity constitutes a breach of law and
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order, or if there is reasonable expectation of violence as a
consequent.
Refusal to Obey Orders (to teach)
Captain Levy
The court martial of Captain Howard Brett Levy on
charges of wilful disobedience of orders and seeking to promote disloyalty and culpable negligence, ended on June 3, 1967
when he was sentenced to three years of hard labor and dismissal from the service. His court-martial is particularly
significant. It was the first time that the war crimes doctrine
of Nuremburg was raised as a defense for wilful disobedience
of an order to train aidsmen of the Green Beret in the treatment of skin diseases in Vietnam. It marked too the first attempt to cite medical ethics as a defense for wilful disobedience. After chief defense counsel, Charles Morgan, Jr., cited
the Nuremburg War Crimes trials and ruling there that any
soldier must disobey an order he knows will result in war
crimes or crimes against humanity, Colonel Brown, the Army's
senior trial judge, rules that the defense could present evidence attempting to prove that the Special Forces (Green
Berets), an elite counter-insurgency unit, were guilty of war
crimes and crimes against humanity. The original publicly
avowed intent of the defense was to plead the defense of truth
by proving that since the Green Beret medics were crosstrained in combat, they were killers first and healers second.
Despite wide advertisement through the communication media,
the defense was unable to produce a live witness with firsthand knowledge of an atrocity committed by a Green Beret
medic. In an out of court hearing, Colonel Brown ruled that
the evidence proffered was insufficient:
While there have been, perhaps, instances of needless
brutality in this struggle in Vietnam, about which
the accused may have learned through conversations
or publications, my conclusion is that there is no evidence that would render the order to train men illegal
on the ground that eventually these men would become engaged in war crimes or in some way prostitute
their medical training by employing it in crimes
against humanity. Consequently on this issue, the
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accused's subjective beliefs may be heard only in mitigation of punishment if the trial reaches that stage.
(New York Times. May 26, 1967).
The defense counsel then invoked medical ethics as a defense. Ife noted that Captain Levy's remark that medicine
was being "prostituted" because Green Beret medics used it
as a "handmaiden of politics" to convert Vietnamese peasants
to loyalty to the Saigon regime. The supposition that a humanitarian act becomes somehow vitiated morally and suspect
because by its advantages and goodness it engenders friendliness and invites loyalty in the recipients left the ten career
officers who sat in judgment unmoved-and for obvious reasons of basic sanity and common sense.
On the issue of freedom of speech, Col. Brown stated that
any member of the armed services had the right to express
opinions, privately and informally "on all political subjects
and candidates-and in strong and provocative words." An
officer can disagree with foreign policy, especially the Vietnam war, as strongly as he wants, so long as his words do not
have the clear intent of creating insubordination and mutiny.
The defense counsel's argument that "If he's a subversive,
he's pretty ineffective subversive" was in this writer's opinion
a misconstruction of casual intent with efficacy, since the inefficacy of a deliberate calculated intent to subvert may well
be a testimonial to the patriotism and firm convictions of the
auditors.
On June 1, 1967, Captain Howard Levy was found guilty
by a general court-martial of disobedience, seeking to promote
disloyalty and of culpable negligence. On November 13, 1967,
the United States Supreme Court denied petition for review
filed by the American Civil Liberties Union for Captain Levy.
Captain Dale E. Noyd
The court-martial of Captain Dale E. Noyd is similar to
that of Captain Levy in that both were officers who refused to
teach as ordered but the two cases are marked off more by
their disparities. Capt. Levy of the United States Army, refused to teach medic aidemen whose military assignment would
be functionally noncombatant while Capt. Noyd of the United
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States Air Force refused to train fighter pilots whose service
would clearly be combatant. Capt. Levy charged that the war
in Vietnam was immoral because of alleged atrocities and he
therefore pleaded defense under the Nuremburg doctrine on
war crimes and wars against humanity. Under this major
premise-moral (international)) legal doctrine, he justified
his exercise of free expression under the protective coverage
of the first amendment guarantees when he urged servicemen
not to fulfill their military duties. Capt. Noyd made no such
charges nor was he charged similarly. Rather, his protest was
that of the selective conscientious objector to American participation in a war of aggression in Vietnam. While avowing
his readiness to fight for his country in a defensive war. He
asked the Air Force either to accept his resignation or to assign
him to noncombat service. His recourse to the civil courts for
an injunction to compel the Air Force to accept either alternative was unsuccessful. The Federal District Court (Denver)
ruled that civil courts must refrain from interfering with the
military and had no jurisdiction until all the available administrative remedies of the military had been exhausted.
Judge William E. Doyle said:
It is not unreasonable to require him to exhaust his
remedies within the (military) establishment before
coming to court. He has enjoyed its benefits and it is
not unreasonable to require him to face its burdens.
(New York Times, April 26, 1967)
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
affirmed. With the refusal of the United States Supreme
Court to act, Capt. Noyd faced court martial proceedings.
The Defense Department has procedures for releasing
servicemen who become conscientious objectors after entering
service, but the Air Force turned down Capt. Noyd's selective
conscientious objection for release to noncombatant duty.
While the courts have recognized a serviceman's right to alter
his beliefs after his enlistment, they have not ruled that he has
a right to object to a particular war.
A nine-member general court-ramtial found Capt. Noyd
guilty of wilful disobedience of a lawful order in refusing to
train a student pilot to fly in Vietnam.
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Col. Harold R. Vague, who presided as law officer of the
court, had ruled that religious convictions would constitute a
defense only if they caused a "mental compulsion" that affected Capt. Noyd's capacity "for specific intent" to disobey
the order. But both the attorneys for the defendant and Capt.
Noyd himself explicitly refused to use any defense that might
imply a plea of insanity. The exchange between the presiding
officer and the defendant discloses only moral compulsion:
Col. Vague: During that time, were you suffering from
any mental disease, defect or derangement that would prevent
you from knowing the difference between right and wrong
and adhering to the right?
Capt. Noyd: When I was up against that order and that
was the ultimate confrontation of what bad been going on for
a year and a half, I could not obey that order. It was conscious
and voluntary, but in a sense I would say I had no choice because I knew it was what I must do.
In response to Col. Vague's question if the captain was at that
time "mentally capable," of obeying the order, the defendant
said: "Yes sir. If I could have brushed aside everything I
believed, I could have obeyed the order." (New York Times,
March 9, 1968. Captain Is Convicted for Refusal To Train
Pilot for Vietnam War.)
Both the Levy and Noyd cases raise a moral-legal
consideration which neither the civil nor military courts have
attended to because the military law itself does not give basis
for that consideration. But extra-judicial reflections might
raise the issue of an argument of greater presumption for
obedience in career officers and professional soldiers than in
enlisted men, and even to a lesser degree in draftees. This
question must be weighed not in the abstract but in the concrete circumstances of an open society dedicated to public
challenge and debate, and to disclosure, not only by private
individuals but also by members of the government in unofficial capacities as well as in official hearings of congressional
committees. Military obedience and discipline cannot reasonably be restricted only to duties with which military personnel
agree. Surely these officers are aware of the forty or more
mutual defense pacts of their government with other governhttps://scholarship.law.uwyo.edu/land_water/vol6/iss2/10
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ments and that the final determination rests with the highest
officials of the national government. I am not now ready to
resolve this question satisfactorily. But may the mutuability
of private judgment on the morality of a war invite less and
less credence in professional soldiers and career officers who,
apart from enjoying certain privileges for years in military
life, are in a sense expected to defer with greater expectation
to the orders of higher officials?
Refusal to Obey Combat Orders.
Under the Uniform Code of Military Justice as most recenly amended by the Military Justice Act of 1968, military
personnel who refuse to obey the order of a superior officer,
v.g., to board a troop ship or having reached the area of military operations, refuse to move out to a combat area with a
unit,-are subject to the provisions of Article 90. Article 99
details nine specific categories of grave offenses in the presence of the enemy in wartime. A formal declaration of war
is not essential because the courts have held since Korea that
combat operations in the presence of the enemy are legally
equivalent. The maximum penalty is death. Such an extreme
punishment is rare and most unlikely. In World War II only
one man out of approximately 13 million men under arms was
executed for military dereliction of duty. A sentence of death
would have to pass through six legal stages of investigation
and review, culminating automatically in a personal review
by the President. Before a death penalty can be handed down,
however, there must be a full investigation under the provisions of the 32d Article of War with rights for "representation, cross-examination and presentation" (Art. 32, Sec. 832,
a,b,c.) If that investigation ascertains that a lawful order
by a superior officer has been refused, the offender is liable to
trial by a locally convened general court-martial. The court's
judgment is next reviewed in the field by officers of the Judge
Advocates Office. It then passes to Washington for further
review by the Judge Advocate General of the military service
concerned, and from there to the Court of Military Appeals,the military equivalent of the United States Supreme Court,
and finally, before sentence can be carried out, to the President. (cf. Articles 59-76)
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The above discourse is clearly unrelayed to the serviceman
who is in the area of military operations but prior to commitment to actual combat makes a plea of becoming a general conscientious objector before proper authorities and asks for
assignment to noncombat service-even if need be in combat
area.
CONCLUTSION

Not every moral right and obligation is translated into
legal rights and obligations nor, even when desirable, is any
moral right and obligation easily translatable into a legal
guarantee. We see no rational difficulty in affirming the
moral right of a subjective conscience to protest a discriminating, selective conscientious objection. We do not thereby
affirm with equal title that such moral right must be a legal
right. We do approach the vexing problem in terms of tolerable, pragmatic considerations. To date, the actual expectancy
of selective conscientious objectors in countries which allow
military service-exemption to them, has not been of such high
incidence as to pose a threat to the requirements of selfdefense. Secondly, every war cannot be supported by a nation
under arms without necessary services of civilians and to such
capacities and functions the selective conscientious objector
may be assigned. Thirdly, even in combat areas a significantly
high proportion of the men under arms never participate in
combat duties. The selective conscientious objector in the
military may be assigned to these necessary services,-caring
for the wounded, transportation, maintenance, food distribution, postal service, etc. One need not be committed to the desirability or even the necessity for granting exemption status
to the selective conscientious objector in holding, as does this
writer, that the prolongation of the rationale of Seeger logically leads to this consideration."'
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